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Drawing on predictions by Merton (1987) regarding the benefits to firms of enhancing visibility with 
prospective investors, we develop hypotheses for the role of pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure 
activities in terms of press releases and attendance at investor and industry conferences by firms 
pursuing an initial public offering (IPO). For a sample of IPOs during 2004–2014 we find that press 
release disclosures and conference attendance are common pre-IPO disclosure strategies. Tests using 
the passage of the 2005 Securities Offering Reform as a source of quasi-exogenous variation in pre-
prospectus disclosures reveal, consistent with Merton (1987), that disclosures in this regime appear 
designed to enhance firm visibility, but have little effect on the extent of adverse selection costs. 
Overall, our evidence suggests that pre-IPO voluntary disclosure strategies provide benefits to newly 
public firms beyond mitigating informational asymmetries.   
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 Merton (1987) argues that before investors can process detailed information about a firm 
designed to alleviate information asymmetry (such as regulated financial information in an annual 
report), investors must first incur a cost to become aware of the firm. In Merton’s (1987) model, 
“visibility” (i.e., increased investor awareness) drives additional interest in the stock by lowering 
setup costs for potential investors, thereby shifting the demand curve outward. With a lack of prior 
regulatory financial reports and an absence of coverage by information intermediaries (e.g., analysts), 
firms contemplating an initial public offering (IPO) face both a lack of visibility and elevated 
information asymmetry. To address these issues, firms pursuing an IPO can voluntarily disclose 
information. While prior studies document a negative association between proxies for information 
asymmetry and the amount of disclosure provided in the IPO prospectus (see, e.g., Leone et al., 
2007; Guo et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2017; Boone et al., 2016), relatively little research examines a 
visibility-enhancing role for pre-IPO disclosures.  
In this study, we focus on two forms of voluntary disclosure activities made by firms prior to 
filing any detailed regulatory information and the related IPO roadshow: firm-initiated press releases 
and attendance at investor and industry conferences. The existence of these pre-prospectus voluntary 
disclosure activities are recognized in the Securities Act of 1933 and its subsequent modifications. 
Broadly, regulations surrounding an IPO seek to impose liability on firms that solicit interest and/or 
make offers of securities prior to filing a regulated prospectus with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), with violations of these restrictions referred to as “gun jumping” (SEC, 2005). 
While firms are permitted to engage in pre-prospectus disclosures that do not make these types of 
offers, no empirical study that we are aware of examines the presence or use of these disclosures by 
firms pursuing an IPO. Our study seeks to fill this gap. 
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We consider two (non-mutually exclusive) roles for pre-prospectus disclosures in the IPO 
process: enhancing firm visibility with prospective investors and/or reducing adverse selection costs 
by mitigating informational asymmetries. Despite a theoretical distinction by Merton (1987, p.501) 
between “advertising about the firm that is targeted for investors” to enhance visibility and 
disclosures that “provide substantive information” capable of reducing information asymmetry, any 
given disclosure may empirically target both roles. While this makes distinguishing the visibility-
enhancing and information asymmetry roles for pre-prospectus disclosures difficult empirically, we 
use Merton’s model to develop hypotheses that distinguish between the use of pre-IPO prospectus 
disclosures by firms pursuing an IPO to enhance their visibility and the alternative (non-mutually 
exclusive) goal of mitigating informational asymmetry with prospective investors.1 
For a sample of 569 IPOs from January 2004 - July 2014, we find that press releases and 
conference attendance are common pre-prospectus disclosure strategies. The median firm pursing an 
IPO issues two press releases and 16.7% of firms attend an investor conference in the year before the 
issuance of a prospectus. Consistent with press release disclosures focusing on enhancing visibility, 
most press releases are short (less than a page) and predominantly product-related (36%). However, 
the determinants of pre-prospectus disclosure suggest a role for both visibility-enhancement and 
information asymmetry as factors in the decision to disclose. Specifically, we find that the likelihood 
of attending a conference or issuing a press release in the pre-prospectus period is significantly 
correlated with the extent of factors associated with elevated information asymmetry, including 
heightened product market competition and operating in a high-technology industry, and with factors 
associated with the need for enhanced visibility including the extent of pre-IPO investment and the 
presence of information intermediaries such as venture capital backing.  
                                                          
1 Notably, Li and You (2015) perform a similar exercise with analyst coverage in that they attempt to empirically 
separate whether analysts improve a firm’s visibility or mitigate a firm’s informational asymmetry. 
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To distinguish between these alternative roles for pre-prospectus disclosure, we draw on the 
theoretical predictions by Merton (1987) to identify several IPO-related outcomes that should be 
associated with visibility-enhancing disclosures, in particular, (1) investor demand for regulated 
financial information; (2) investor demand for the firm’s equity (as reflected in price changes); (3) 
the breadth of post-IPO equity ownership; and (4) post-IPO coverage by information intermediaries 
(e.g., analysts and financial press). Based on Merton’s (1987) model, we expect that visibility-
enhancing disclosures will lead to elevated investor demand for financial information, positive IPO 
price revisions, increased breadth of ownership, and higher post-IPO coverage by information 
intermediaries. To the extent that these forms of disclosure also (or primarily) serve to reduce 
information asymmetry, we expect disclosures will be associated with reduced IPO underpricing and 
lower bid-ask spreads in the post-IPO period, suggesting lower adverse selection costs. 
Despite these predictions, the decision by firms to engage in pre-prospectus disclosure is 
endogenous. In particular, the associations with post-IPO outcomes that we observe may be due to 
the fundamentally different firms that choose to engage in pre-prospectus disclosure rather than due 
to the effects of the disclosure itself. As a result, we augment our identification strategy in two ways. 
First, we exploit a regulatory reform that affected firms’ ability to engage in pre-prospectus visibility-
enhancing disclosures. The December 2005 Securities Offering Reform (SOR) offers safe harbor for 
communications (both oral and written) by firms when made more than 30 days prior to filing a 
registration statement as long as the communications do not reference a securities offering. In 
contrast, the SOR continues to prohibit the disclosure of forward-looking information in the pre-IPO 
period. Thus, the SOR liberalizes firms’ ability to make visibility-enhancing disclosures while 
holding constant the regulatory constraints on disclosures to address informational frictions, such as 
forward-looking earnings forecasts. Consistent with the SOR liberalizing firms’ ability to engage in 
visibility-enhancing disclosures in a pre-prospectus period, we find that conference attendance and 
press release issuance are both more frequent in the post-SOR period. In addition, the content of such 
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press releases shifts around the SOR in that firms reduce (increase) the proportion of earnings- and 
equity-related (product-related) press releases. Thus, the SOR helps us better separate the effects of 
visibility-enhancing disclosure activities on our IPO-related outcomes from the (non-mutually 
exclusive) alternative of voluntary disclosure to mitigate informational asymmetries. Second, to 
ensure that samples of disclosing and non-disclosing firms appear similar based on fundamental 
determinants of the decision to disclose, we use entropy balancing to reweight the control sample of 
non-disclosing firms in our regressions so that no significant differences exist in the means, 
variances, or skewness of any key disclosure determinants across the two samples. This form of 
matching on observables (i.e., entropy balancing) retains all control sample observations while 
limiting concerns with potentially noisy one-to-one matches (Hainmueller, 2012; McMullin and 
Schonberger, 2015). After entropy balancing, disclosing and non-disclosing samples display minimal 
differences in the distribution of determinants associated with the decision to disclose, aiding in our 
identification of the effect of the disclosures themselves separate from (correlated) fundamentals.  
Our main findings are as follows. With regard to whether investors acquire detailed firm 
information in response to pre-prospectus disclosures, we find that investor search activity on the 
SEC’s EDGAR site during the IPO filing period is positively related to the issuance of pre-
prospectus press releases and conference attendance. The fact that this positive relation is 
concentrated in the post-SOR period is evidence that EDGAR search activity in the IPO filing 
window appears more sensitive to visibility-enhancing disclosures. Because the filing period includes 
the IPO roadshow, this evidence further suggests a complementary relation between pre-prospectus 
disclosures and subsequent information search by prospective investors surrounding the roadshow. In 
terms of whether shareholder demand for IPO shares is affected when firms provide more pre-
prospectus voluntary disclosure, we find a positive association between IPO filing price revisions and 
pre-prospectus disclosure that is also more pronounced in the post-SOR period. For example, a one-
standard deviation increase in press release issuance is associated with a filing period price increase 
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of 4.3% in the post-SOR period. In further support of a visibility-enhancing role, we find a positive 
relation between measures of post-IPO coverage by information intermediaries and pre-prospectus 
disclosure.2 For example, a one-standard deviation increase in press release issuance is associated 
with an increase in analyst following of 13.5% (a predicted increase of .8 analysts relative to the 
median of six post-IPO analysts per firm) and a predicted increase in post-IPO media articles of 
13.5%, while attending at least one conference is associated with a 16.9% predicted increase in post-
IPO media coverage. Importantly, these results are also stronger subsequent to the SOR and are 
robust to the more stringent entropy balancing test specification. We also find some evidence that 
IPO firms’ investor bases are more dispersed (with fewer concentrated holdings) in the presence of 
pre-prospectus disclosures. 
While the empirical evidence thus far suggests a visibility role for pre-prospectus disclosures, 
we also explore whether these disclosures serve to mitigate adverse selection costs. First, with regard 
to IPO underpricing, we find a positive relation between underpricing and pre-prospectus disclosure 
(particularly for press releases), which is consistent with underpricing reflecting increased investor 
attention and/or a partial adjustment to investor demand by the underwriter (see, Hanley, 1993). This 
positive relation suggests that rather than mitigating the extent of adverse selection costs, disclosing 
firms leave money on the table in the form of underpricing.3 Second, we find no relation between 
pre-prospectus disclosures and either post-IPO bid-ask spreads or equity price volatility (during the 
24-day quiet period), inconsistent with these disclosures reducing uncertainty for investors trading in 
the IPO firms’ shares. Broadly, these tests provide empirical evidence consistent with Merton’s 
                                                          
2 Related research documents the importance of this post-IPO visibility. Mehran and Peristiani (2009) and Bharath 
and Dittmar (2010) find that IPO firms exit public markets when they fail to generate sufficient investor attention 
subsequent to their IPO. 
3 In additional tests, we find that firms with more pre-prospectus disclosures display greater wealth revaluations 
during the IPO process, consistent with recent research suggesting a role for prospect theory in IPO pricing (e.g., 
Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Willenborg et al., 2015). 
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(1987, p.501) distinction between visibility-enhancing disclosures and disclosures that “provide 
substantive information” to investors. 
We conduct additional validation tests for our main results. First, we rule out that the post-
IPO pricing effects and pre-IPO voluntary disclosure are merely artifacts of increased underwriter 
effort via due diligence or stock promotion (see, e.g., Hanley and Hoberg, 2010; Cook et al., 2006). 
Second, we rule out a “hype” explanation for our results by examining long-run post-IPO equity 
performance. Inconsistent with uninformed investors overpricing the IPO at the end of the first day 
of trading, we find no evidence of underperformance in the year following the offering for firms with 
more extensive pre-prospectus disclosure.  
Our paper contributes to the IPO and disclosure literatures in several ways. First, in contrast 
to research on voluntary disclosure for seasoned firms (see Beyer et al., 2010), research on the 
disclosure strategies of private firms (that are going public) is far more limited. On this dimension, 
disclosure theories (and related studies on IPO disclosure) generally presume that investors are aware 
of a firm’s existence (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). This has led studies of firms pursuing an IPO to focus 
almost solely on the role that disclosure plays in mitigating adverse selection (see, e.g., Leone et al., 
2007) subject to proprietary costs.4 Using Merton's (1987) model as a foundation, we add to this 
literature by documenting the need by some firms for pre-IPO visibility and its fundamental impact 
on their voluntary disclosure choices before they file their IPO prospectus. Second, we add to the 
literature on how firms can generate more attention when going public (such as lowering an IPO 
price, increasing issuance size, or hiring a prestigious underwriter, see, e.g., Demers and Lewellen, 
2003; Dambra et al., 2018; Jeon et al., 2015). Our evidence suggests that firms can generate more 
attention when going public by modifying their pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure strategies. Third, 
                                                          
4 For research that focuses on the role of proprietary costs in explaining disclosure patterns by newly public firms, 
see work by Boone et al. (2016); Schrand and Verrecchia (2005); Dambra et al. (2015); Hanley and Hoberg (2010); 
Loughran and McDonald (2013); Guo et al. (2004); Barth et al. (2017); Brown et al. (2018); Feng et al. (2018). 
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our study sheds light on the economic consequences of pre-IPO voluntary disclosures following the 
2005 SOR. While some stakeholders expressed concern that by removing restrictions on disclosure, 
the SOR would incent firms to “hype” their stock prior to raising capital (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 
2000), the evidence based on firms pursuing seasoned equity offerings suggests that firms making 
voluntary disclosures experience reduced information asymmetry in the post-SOR regime (see, e.g., 
Shroff et al., 2013; Clinton et al., 2014). In contrast to this evidence for seasoned issuers, we find no 
evidence that managers at firms pursuing an IPO use post-SOR disclosures to mitigate adverse 
selection costs. We interpret this as evidence that IPO firms’ ability to disclose in a less-regulated 
setting appears better suited to improve visibility, which itself is an economic benefit for firms going 
public (see Lowry et al., 2017).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related research and 
uses Merton’s (1987) model to develop the underpinnings for our hypotheses and tests. Section 3 
discusses sample selection procedures and the research design. Section 4 provides descriptive 
statistics while Sections 5 and 6 report results. Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Hypothesis Development  
2.1.  Merton’s (1987) Model 
 Merton (1987) models an equilibrium where investors possess incomplete information prior 
to making investment decisions and argues that before investors can process detailed information to 
mitigate asymmetric information problems, they must first be aware of the firm’s existence. In 
Merton’s model, investors face a fixed “set-up” cost inhibiting them from learning about all new 
securities. From a firm’s perspective, it can therefore be optimal for managers to expend resources 
(i.e., issue disclosures) to make investors aware of the firm because the attention generated from new 
(previously unaware) investors will increase the investor base and the corresponding stock price. The 
result is a tradeoff for firms between the costs of disclosure and the benefits of visibility with 
prospective investors. In examining this tradeoff, the costs of visibility-enhancing disclosures are 
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somewhat difficult to measure empirically as they stem from expenditures on the investor relations 
function and the use of management time to prepare and make disclosures. In our determinants 
models (discussed in detail in Section 3), we obtain proxies for variation in the sophistication of pre-
IPO institutions as a proxy for expenditures on the investor relations function. In contrast, we can 
observe variation in the outcomes of visibility-enhancing disclosures more directly. These outcomes 
form the basis of our predictions following from Merton’s (1987) model in our IPO setting. 
 First, in settings where managers expend resources to engage in visibility-enhancing 
disclosures, the outcome should be increased investor acquisition and processing of detailed 
information about the firm. With regard to the detailed information in the IPO prospectus, prior 
studies find that prospectus disclosures mitigate informational frictions between issuers and 
prospective investors.5 The consistent conclusion reached is that there is a negative association 
between prospectus disclosure quality and informational asymmetry (measured via underpricing or 
other post-IPO measures of market liquidity). We extend these studies by focusing on the effect of 
pre-prospectus voluntary disclosures on investors’ subsequent acquisition of detailed information, 
which we measure via downloads from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) EDGAR 
site during the prospectus filing period that includes the IPO roadshow. In essence, our first 
hypothesis (in null form) considers the relation between pre-prospectus disclosure and the acquisition 
of more detailed disclosures that are the focus of prior research examining shifts in information 
asymmetry around the IPO: 
H1: Pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure has no effect on investor’s acquisition and 
processing of detailed firm information available in regulatory filings. 
 
                                                          
5 For instance, Leone et al. (2007) analyze the “Use of Proceeds” disclosure in the IPO prospectus, while Hanley and 
Hoberg (2010), Loughran and McDonald (2013), Brown et al. (2017), Guo et al. (2014), Barth et al. (2017), 
Chaplinsky et al. (2017), and Boone et al. (2016) either hand-collect data or use textual analysis to measure the 
“quality” of IPO prospectus disclosure.   
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If firms pursue visibility-enhancing pre-prospectus disclosures, Merton’s model implies they 
should experience an upward shift in the demand for their shares (with a corresponding increase in 
price) as a result of more investors willing to incur the lowered setup cost to become aware of the 
firm. We predict that this effect will manifest in both the pricing and ownership of the IPO. In terms 
of pricing, we predict a positive relation between visibility-enhancing pre-prospectus disclosures and 
filing price revisions. This prediction is motivated by visibility-enhancing pre-prospectus disclosures 
stimulating excess demand from institutional investors during the IPO book-building process. That 
said, in the presence of underwriters with incentives for a lower initial filing price range prior to a 
road show (see Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Willenborg et al., 2015) the predicted price improvement 
implied by Merton (1987) may not be fully incorporated in the initial IPO valuation. Consistent with 
this idea, some studies find that only a portion of the positive information obtained during the book-
building period gets into the offer price (see, Hanley, 1993). Any such partial adjustment would lead 
to a positive prediction between pre-prospectus disclosure and first-day returns. Alternatively, if 
visibility-enhancing pre-prospectus disclosures predominantly influence retail investors’ setup costs, 
we would expect a similar relation with first-day underpricing as retail investors are largely unable to 
participate in the book-building process and are typically restricted in the allocation of IPO shares. In 
contrast to this prediction for a positive relation with underpricing, if pre-prospectus disclosures 
primarily serve to mitigate adverse selection costs then we should find lower (rather than higher) 
underpricing for firms engaging in more voluntary disclosure. This discussion leads to our pricing 
hypothesis (in null form): 
H2: Pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure has no effect on IPO pricing. 
Beyond the pricing effects of pre-prospectus disclosure discussed above are the implications 
of that disclosure on firm ownership post-IPO. Based on Merton’s (1987) model, we expect that 
firms pursuing visibility-enhancing pre-prospectus disclosures will exhibit more dispersed 
ownership. In particular, we expect smaller average ownership stakes and fewer concentrated stakes 
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by investors. In line with this, prior IPO literature emphasizes that one of the key benefits to going 
public is obtaining access to a diversified shareholder base (e.g., Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; 
Lowry et al., 2017). This discussion leads to our third hypothesis (in null form):  
H3: Pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure has no effect on ownership dispersion 
following the IPO. 
 
If in fact pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure enhances investor attention, the firm should 
also obtain benefits from enhanced visibility such as higher post-IPO analyst coverage and media 
attention (see, e.g., Mehran and Peristiani, 2010; Liu et al., 2014; Li and You, 2015). For example, 
Liu and Ritter (2011) emphasize the importance of non-price dimensions of the IPO process such as 
generating sufficient analyst coverage. Our fourth hypothesis is (in null form):  
H4: Pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure has no effect on coverage of the firm by 
analysts and the financial press following the IPO. 
 
As noted above, a key aspect of Merton’s model to our setting is that it distinguishes between 
visibility-enhancing disclosures and disclosures designed to mitigate information asymmetry. In 
specific, Merton (1987, p.501) states that “Although not mutually exclusive, the techniques used and 
resources expended by the firm to expand its investor base are logically separable from those used to 
provide substantive information that existing shareholders can use to evaluate their portfolio position 
in the firm.” Consistent with a distinction between the potential effects of pre-prospectus voluntary 
disclosures increasing visibility, we expect that visibility-enhancing pre-prospectus disclosures will 
be largely unrelated to measures of information asymmetry in the post-IPO period. Evidence in favor 
of this distinction between visibility-enhancing and information asymmetry roles for disclosure 
parallels a distinction made by Li and You (2015) in their examination of the effect of analyst 
coverage changes for seasoned firms.  
However, whether pre-prospectus disclosures can ameliorate asymmetric information 
problems similar to that of the detailed prospectus (e.g., Leone et al. 2007) is an unanswered 
empirical question. We test this prediction in our IPO setting by examining the information 
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asymmetry reflected in average daily bid-ask spreads and equity price volatility during the 24-day 
quiet period following the start of IPO trading (Guo, Lev, and Zhou, 2004; Schrand and Verrecchia, 
2005). Our final hypothesis is (in null form): 
H5: Pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure has no effect on the informational asymmetry 
in the immediate post-IPO period. 
 
3.  Sample Selection, Research Design, and Identification Strategy 
3.1  Sample selection 
 We obtain a sample of IPOs by U.S. firms from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New 
Issues database with initial filing dates on or after January 1, 2004 and a successful offering 
completed on or before July 28, 2014. This period aligns with detailed coverage of press releases and 
media articles via Ravenpack data available to us (see below). On this sample, we impose the 
following filters: 1) we include IPO firms issuing common stock (without warrants attached, see 
Barth et al., 2017); 2) we exclude closed-end funds, open-end funds, real estate investment trusts, 
American Depository Receipts, rights offerings, limited partnerships, and special purpose vehicles 
(which excludes SIC codes 6091, 6371, 6722, 6726, 6732, 6733, and 6799); 3) we exclude IPO firms 
already registered with the SEC at the time of the IPO, namely, firms with 10-K/Q or 8-K filings 
more than 3-months prior to the IPO date (see Cedergren, 2014); and 4) we exclude firms that are 
spin-offs, firms going IPO after a leveraged buyout, firms with wholly-owned subsidiaries that are 
publicly-traded, or privatizations. Unlike the IPO firms in which we are interested, all of the firms in 
filters (3) and (4) have prior experience with the disclosures required by public equity markets. Firms 
passing these filters must have data available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT (to calculate underpricing, 
etc.); firm age on Jay Ritter’s site (https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/); and post-IPO 
institutional ownership available on Thompson Reuters. To isolate firms with visibility needs, we 
delete 40 firms that have full article media coverage by Dow Jones media sources in the one to two 
years prior to their filing of an IPO prospectus (this filter excludes high-profile IPOs with little need 
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to create additional visibility, including Facebook, Alphabet [Google], Tesla, Twitter, and 
LinkedIn).6 Last, we delete observations in the top and bottom one percent of the distributions of 
return on assets and pre-IPO new financing to eliminate outliers.7 These filters and requirements 
leave us with a sample of 569 IPOs. Table 1, Panel A summarizes these sample selection procedures. 
3.2. Research design 
  
 To test our hypotheses related to pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure activities and IPO 
outcomes, we estimate the following regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) or a negative 
binomial model (for dependent variables that are counts following the recommendation by Rock et 
al., 2000) for each of the dependent (IPO outcome) variables used to test our hypotheses:8 
[𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒] =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1[𝑃𝑟𝑒‐ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒] + 𝛽2𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐴𝑇 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐷𝐴𝐷_𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑖𝑔4 +
𝛽10𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑒𝑤_𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽12𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑈𝑊 + 𝛽13𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑞𝑅𝐸𝑇_90 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑃𝑂𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_90 + 𝛽15𝐻𝑖𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽16𝐻𝑖𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝐵𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽17𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 +
𝛽18𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ_𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸 + 𝜓 + 𝜀                (1) 
 
3.2.1 IPO outcomes 
 
To start, we describe the five sets of outcomes that we use to investigate the hypothesized 
benefits to pursuing visibility-enhancing disclosures under Merton’s (1987) model. To measure the 
acquisition of detailed firm information by prospective investors, we utilize the SEC’s EDGAR log 
file which contains the timestamp and IP address associated with documents accessed on EDGAR. In 
our setting, the primary document available in the pre-IPO period is the prospectus. Log_EDGAR is 
the natural log of the total document retrievals for each firm during the filing period up to the date of 
the IPO.9 We measure the pricing of IPO firms using filing price revisions (Revision) and first-day 
                                                          
6 Unreported robustness tests reveal that our results are largely unaffected by the exclusion of these firms. 
7 Using robust regression to address potential influential observations (see Leone et al., 2018) leads to similar 
inferences (results untabulated). 
8 For a complete description of all variables used in our empirical analysis refer to Appendix A. 
9 We follow Drake et al. (2015) and eliminate IP addresses that likely reflect automated data retrieval services, 
namely IP addresses that access more than 5 documents in any one minute period or more than 1,000 documents in a 
given day. For a list of daily EDGAR log files see: https://www.sec.gov/dera/data/edgar-log-file-data-set.html. 
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equity price changes (Underpricing). Revision measures the percentage change from the mid-point of 
the initial filing price range in the prospectus to the final IPO offer price. Underpricing measures the 
percentage change from the IPO offer price to the first-day closing price. If visibility stimulates 
investor demand for the firm’s equity, then pre-prospectus disclosure will be positively associated 
with price revisions during the book-building period as well as with first-day underpricing (in the 
latter case, to the extent that price adjustments are partial and/or that visibility improves for retail 
investors). Alternatively, if asymmetric information is primarily mitigated through increased pre-
prospectus disclosure then we should expect to find a negative association between Underpricing and 
our pre-prospectus disclosure proxies. 
Because Merton’s (1987) model implies more dispersed ownership for more visible firms, we 
investigate the number of institutional owners holding concentrated stakes as measured by holdings 
in excess of one percent of the post-IPO equity (Num_InstOwn>1%) and the average size of an 
institutional owner’s stake (Avg_IOStake) measured as the percentage of institutional ownership 
divided by the number of owners listed on the Thomson Reuters database for the first ownership 
reporting date following the IPO. We expect fewer concentrated holdings and smaller average stakes 
for firms with more visibility-enhancing disclosures, consistent with more dispersed ownership. 
Turning to coverage by information intermediaries in the post-IPO period, we measure analyst 
coverage (Analyst_Count) as the number of unique analysts issuing an EPS forecast for the firm in 
I/B/E/S during the 12-month post-IPO period.  
To measure coverage in the financial press we use the natural log of the number of Dow 
Jones news articles (Log_Media_1Y) about the firm in the 12-month post-IPO period. Finally, as 
noted above, Merton (1987) distinguishes between visibility-enhancing disclosures and disclosures 
designed to communicate substantive information regarding the firm’s prospects. Based on this 
distinction, we should expect pre-prospectus disclosures to be largely unrelated to measures of 
information asymmetry. However, prior literature documents a negative association between a range 
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of voluntary disclosures and informational asymmetry (see Beyer et al., 2010 for a review), 
suggesting a negative relation as an alternative. To examine this empirically, we approximate post-
IPO informational asymmetry using the daily average closing bid-ask spread (BA_Spread1M) and the 
volatility of style-adjusted daily equity returns (STD_ARET1M) over the 24-day quiet period starting 
one day after the IPO offer date.10  
3.2.2  Pre-prospectus disclosure variables  
 The variables used to test our hypotheses are the incidence of pre-prospectus voluntary 
disclosure activities measured as firm-initiated press releases and attendance at investor and industry 
conferences by private firms prior to an IPO. The press release variable (Log_PR) is the natural log 
of one plus the number of press releases issued by the firm in the 12-month period ending with the 
filing of its IPO prospectus. We obtain press releases from Ravenpack’s Dow Jones and PR Editions. 
Each press release must have a relevance score of 100 (i.e., be directly about the firm) and a novelty 
score of 100 (i.e., the first instance of a press release).11 We measure firm attendance at investor and 
industry conferences via an indicator variable (IConf) set to one for IPO firms attending at least one 
investor conference in the 12-month period ending with the filing of their IPO prospectus (and zero 
otherwise). Conference attendance is identified from Bloomberg or Ravenpack. Specifically, we use 
Bloomberg’s EVTS database beginning in 2003 for event types tagged as “Corporate Access”, 
“Analyst Marketing”, or “TV/Conf/Pres. Conference”, which we augment with Ravenpack where the 
press release type is listed as “conference-participant”.12  
                                                          
10 We focus on the quiet period to avoid differences in post-IPO disclosures because the quiet period is largely 
restricted to releases of mandatory financial information (see Cedergren, 2014). 
11 Ravenpack’s process for adding coverage for a firm comprises two steps. First, Ravenpack adds a firm and begins 
covering press releases and articles for the firm from that date forward. Second, when Ravenpack releases a new 
version of its database, the data provider takes all entities added prior to the version date and back-fills all available 
press releases and articles for each added firm. Because IPO firms are typically added as of the IPO’s offering date, 
this back-filling feature is necessary for us to observe pre-prospectus press releases. As a result, we end our sample 
with the date of Ravenpack’s most recent back-filling for version 4.0, which is July 28, 2014. 
12 We also exclude press releases of the type “conference-organizer” because these stem from brokerage houses 
announcing each of the firms attending that brokerage’s conference, resulting in essentially duplicate press releases. 
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3.2.3 Disclosure determinants and control variables 
 In our determinants models for the decision to engage in pre-prospectus disclosures, we seek 
to capture variation in the costs and benefits of issuing visibility-enhancing disclosures across firms. 
We draw on the IPO, voluntary disclosure, and visibility literatures for these determinants. We 
include issuer characteristics by including firm size (Log_AT and Log_REVT), age (Log_Age), dual-
class share holdings (DualClass), profitability (ROA), and research and advertising intensity 
(RDAD_Exp), which have been shown to affect post-IPO outcomes, the need for visibility, and the 
propensity to engage in voluntary disclosure (see e.g., Green et al., 2014; Chemmanur and Yan, 
2009; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Jones, 2007; Smart and Zutter, 2003; Kasznik and Lev, 1995). 
Next, we control for the presence of information intermediaries (VC and Big4) which play an 
important role in the certification of newly public firms (see Field, 1995; Brav and Gompers, 1997; 
Weber and Willenborg, 2003). In addition, we expect the presence of these institutions to be 
correlated with firms’ sophistication in terms of the investor relations function. To the extent that the 
investor relations’ department determines the amount of visibility-enhancing disclosure issued by 
firms, we expect that firms lacking VC-backing and a Big 4 auditor will face constraints on issuing 
pre-prospectus disclosures. Relatedly, we expect that firms with elevated proprietary costs will 
garner relatively greater visibility benefits from pre-prospectus disclosures, as these firms face 
competitive constraints in their prospectus disclosures. Consistent with this, the IPO disclosure 
literature argues that issuers make trade-offs between minimizing information asymmetry versus 
revealing competitive information through their proprietary disclosures (see Beyer et al., 2010). We 
follow Boone et al. (2016) and measure the extent of product market competition for IPO firms using 
the product market fluidity measure developed by Hoberg et al. (2014) for firms in the year of the 
IPO (ProdMktFluid, available from the Hoberg-Phillips data library: http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/). 
Following the argument by Merton (1987) that the benefits to visibility-enhancing disclosures will be 
greatest for firms with more extensive project investments, we control for the amount of new debt 
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and/or equity capital raised in the pre-IPO period measured as a proportion of the book value of total 
assets (New_FIN). To control for the state of the IPO market, we include the value-weighted buy-
and-hold return to all NASDAQ stocks over the 90-day period ending one day prior to the offering 
date (NasdaqRET_90) along with the number of IPOs during this same 90-day period 
(IPOCount_90) (see, e.g., Lowry and Schwert, 2004; Chaplinsky et al., 2017).13  
In our models for Num_InstOwn>1%, Underpricing, and Log_Media_1Y, we include 
additional control variables. In specific, following Hanley, 1993) we augment our Underpricing 
regression by including Revision as an additional control variable in Equation (1). Following  Cook 
et al. (2006) and Liu et al. (2014) we augment our Log_Media_1Y models by including filing-period 
financial press coverage (Log_Media_PreIPO) to control for underwriter due diligence in garnering 
media coverage during the filing period. In our Num_InstOwn>1% negative binomial model, we 
include the percentage of institutional ownership (InstOwn) to isolate the variation in the count of 
concentrated holdings conditional on the total institutional ownership in the firm’s post-IPO equity. 
Finally, to account for industry and time variation in post-IPO outcomes, we include separate 
industry indicators for bio-technology firms (HiTech_Bio), remaining high technology firms as 
identified by SDC (HiTech_NonBio), and financial services firms (Bank) along with year-fixed 
effects (𝜓) to account for the pre-SOR and post-JOBS period (which we separately examine via 
PreSOR and PostJOBS indicator variables in our determinants models, respectively).  
3.3.  Identification strategy 
An implicit assumption underlying our hypotheses is that pre-prospectus disclosures affect 
subsequent IPO outcomes. However, Eq. (1) can only identify an association between IPO outcomes 
and pre-prospectus disclosure activities. To enhance our inferences, we use two approaches to aid in 
identifying a causal relation. First, we exploit a regulatory shock that affects firms’ ability to provide 
                                                          
13 In our Revision models, we include the value-weighted return to the NASDAQ index for the full filing period 
(NasdaqRET_File), rather than the return over the 90-day pre-IPO window. 
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visibility-enhancing disclosures prior to issuing an IPO prospectus while holding constant firms’ 
ability to use these same pre-prospectus disclosures to convey information with a primary goal of 
reducing information asymmetry (i.e., forward-looking information). Second, we employ entropy 
balancing to ensure similarity in key (observable) disclosure determinants across our treatment and 
control samples to aid in ruling out the effects of correlated fundamentals across the groups of 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms. Achieving covariate balance using entropy balancing further 
serves to rule out functional form misspecification as an alternative explanation for the relation 
between independent and dependent variables when using a multiple regression (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983; Shipman et al., 2017). We discuss each identification strategy in further detail below. 
3.3.1 The 2005 Securities Offering Reform (SOR) 
 In December 2005, the SEC promulgated the Securities Offering Reform (SOR) to liberalize 
permitted disclosures prior to a securities offering.14 The SOR specifically outlined permitted 
communications in the period prior to filing a prospectus. For the purposes of our study, there are 
three provisions of the SOR that shift the disclosure landscape for IPO firms. First, the SOR permits 
communications (both oral and written) between issuers and prospective investors more than 30 days 
prior to filing a registration statement as long as such communications do not reference an upcoming 
security offering. Prior to the SOR, such communications ran the risk of litigation as “gun-jumping” 
violations. Second, the SOR permits disclosure of “regularly released factual business information” 
at any time to mitigate litigation risk. Third, the SOR defines the forms of written communication by 
issuers that must be publicly filed and disclosed to all prospective investors.  
 Of particular relevance to our setting is that under the SOR, direct oral communications, such 
as those occurring at investor conferences, are exempt from these latter public disclosure and filing 
requirements. In addition, the SOR continues to prohibit firms from providing forward-looking 
                                                          
14 The final version of the SOR is available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8591fr.pdf. 
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disclosures, such as earnings forecasts, which might otherwise serve to mitigate information 
asymmetry and from referencing a future offering if a formal prospectus is not yet issued. This is in 
stark contrast to the regulations for seasoned public firms, which are permitted to increase their use 
of forward-looking forecasts prior to a securities offering under the SOR regime.15 We exploit these 
provisions of the SOR and use its passage to identify the effect of visibility-enhancing disclosures on 
IPO pricing and post-IPO outcomes by estimating the following empirical model: 
[𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒] =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑂𝑅 × 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑅 + 
𝜮𝜷𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔 + 𝜓 + 𝜀                                                                               (2) 
 
The coefficients of interest in Eq. (2) are 𝛽2, which captures the overall effect of pre-
prospectus press releases activities and 𝛽3, which identifies whether such disclosures have a 
differential impact prior to the passage of the SOR (with the main effect of the post-SOR variable 
reflected in the year fixed effects). To classify IPOs as pre-SOR, we require disclosures for 9 out of 
12 months during the one-year pre-prospectus period to overlap with the period prior to the passage 
of the SOR. Thus, we classify IPOs with an initial SEC filing date on or before March 1, 2006 as pre-
SOR IPOs (i.e., PreSOR = 1 and 0 otherwise). In this way, controlling for annual time-fixed effects 
(and the remaining vector of control variables as detailed in Eq. [1]), we attempt to isolate the 
visibility-enhancing role of pre-prospectus disclosures and their differential effects on IPO-related 
outcomes following the passage of the SOR.16 Given the paucity of conference attendance prior to 
the SOR (see to Table 1), we are unable to identify an IConf and PreSOR interaction.     
3.3.2 Entropy Balancing 
If disclosing and non-disclosing firms differ fundamentally prior to the IPO, it becomes less 
clear whether pre-prospectus disclosures or those fundamentals are the cause of variation in visibility 
that we document. To address this concern, we employ entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012) as a 
                                                          
15 Empirical evidence indicates that this SOR provision led to an increase in and more informative voluntary 
disclosure prior to seasoned equity offerings (see, Shroff et al., 2013; Clinton et al., 2014). 
16 We also differentially analyze the information content of these press releases surrounding the SOR in Section 4.2. 
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means to match firms with pre-prospectus disclosures to a control sample of IPO firms without such 
disclosures. Briefly, entropy balancing solves a constrained optimization in order to select weights 
for each observation in the control sample that equalizes the distributional moments (i.e., mean, 
variance, and skewness) between the treatment sample and the weighted control sample. The process 
stays as close as possible to having equal weights while avoiding using negative weights. The result 
is a weighted control sample that is indistinguishable (in distribution) from the treatment sample.  
Because the size of our sample of 569 IPOs poses an issue when entropy balancing over all 
17 control variables and 3 distribution moments, the first step in using entropy balancing is to 
understand the important determinants that are associated with the decision to engage in pre-
prospectus voluntary disclosure. To do this we run an OLS (Logit) model where the dependent 
variable is the natural log of the count of pre-prospectus press releases, Log_PR (an indicator 
variable, IConf, set to one when issuers attend a conference prior to filing a prospectus and zero 
otherwise). We include the full slate of control variables listed in Eq. (1) since they have implications 
for a firm’s ability to ameliorate informational asymmetries, to enhance investor recognition, and/or 
reflect the extent of any proprietary costs of disclosure.  
Results of estimating these determinants models are presented in Table B.1 of Appendix B. 
In general, the determinants models show that the extent of press release disclosure is significantly 
associated with the degree of product market competition, the amount of firm sales (as a proxy for 
size), pre-IPO investment, the presence of venture capital funding and/or a Big 4 auditor, and 
operating in a high-technology industry. Similarly, the likelihood of attending a pre-prospectus 
conference is significantly related to the extent of product market competition, pre-IPO return on 
assets, the presence of a Big 4 audit firm, and operating in a high-technology industry. Evidence from 
the determinants models is consistent with firms relying on visibility-enhancing disclosure in the 
presence of elevated proprietary costs to regulated disclosures due to product market competition, 
which is in line with recent evidence on the importance of proprietary costs in predicting redactions 
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in the IPO prospectus (Boone et al., 2016). The relation with a Big 4 audit firm and venture capitalist 
backing suggest that pre-IPO information intermediaries aid in certifying more extensive pre-
prospectus disclosures. 
Panels A and B of Table B.2 in Appendix B present summary statistics for covariate balance 
before and after entropy balancing on the key covariates identified by the determinants models.17 
Consistent with the importance of these determinants, we find significant covariate imbalance on 
both means and variances before entropy balancing. After entropy balancing, standardized 
differences are near zero and variance ratios clustered around one, consistent with balanced 
covariates (Rubin, 2001).18 The success of our entropy balancing approach in achieving covariate 
balance leads us to use the control sample weights identified by this process in our subsequent tests 
to rule out the effects of correlated disclosure determinants along with addressing functional form 
misspecification in our multiple regression models examining the role of pre-prospectus disclosure in 
explaining variation in IPO outcome variables.  
4.  Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Sample of IPOs  
 Table 1, Panel B provides a frequency distribution of IPOs by year, along with corresponding 
distributions of the percent of IPO firms issuing press releases and attending investor conferences 
during the 12-month pre-prospectus period. Panel B shows that our sample of IPOs is not clustered in 
any particular year, although there is a marked increase over time in the likelihood of an IPO firm 
attending an investor conference in the pre-prospectus period. With regard to pre-prospectus press 
                                                          
17 We use the match ratios reported in Table B.2 (discussed below) to verify that our entropy-balanced control 
samples do not assign large weights to a handful of control sample observations. 
18 As for any matched sample, the resulting estimate of the treatment effect is specific to the particular matched 
sample. In our setting, this means that tests relying on entropy-balanced control samples will not include both of our 
independent variables in the same model (Log_PR and IConf) because each is used to determine the particular 
treatment and weighted control sample. In essence, under entropy balancing, matching is used in place of a multiple 
regression approach to control for the effect of the alternative disclosure channel. 
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releases, the proportion of IPOs issuing press releases is above 50% in each year, with some evidence 
of an increasing trend over time. Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on pre-prospectus 
disclosures and conference attendance. Pre-prospectus press release disclosures are present for 67.5% 
of the IPO firms where the log of the number of press releases issued in the pre-prospectus period 
(Log_PR) ranges from zero up to 4.06 (58 press releases), while 16.7% of firms attend an investor 
conference. Panel A also reports on the IPOs around the SEC’s adoption of the Securities Offering 
Reform (SOR) on December 1, 2005 and with an offering date after the passage of the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups (JOBS) Act on April 4, 2012.19 As noted in Section 3.3, we use passage of the 
SOR to identify the hypothesized benefits to pursuing visibility-enhancing disclosures. 
Approximately one-third of the IPOs in our sample occur in the pre-SOR period.  
With regard to firm fundamentals, Panel B reveals that the sample is predominantly (69%) 
high-technology firms based on HiTech_Bio=1 or HiTech_NonBio=1, with almost half of these high-
technology IPOs in the healthcare industry. The average firm has investments in intangible assets, as 
a percentage of operating expenses, of 28.6% (RDAD_Exp). The sample IPOs exhibits substantial 
variation in size based on a mean book value of total assets of $57.5 million, with a minimum 
(maximum) of $0.8 million ($12.1 billion). These firms also tend to be young (the median IPO has an 
age of 9 years since founding, Log_Age = 2.197) and unprofitable. In the year prior to the IPO, firms 
raise new debt or equity financing, New_FIN, at a mean (median) rate of 31% (7.1%) of total assets. 
In terms of their pre-IPO information environment, 72.2% (81%) of the sample IPOs have venture 
capital backing (a Big 4 audit firm). Finally, 22.7% of IPOs will list on the New York Stock 
Exchange (Exch_NYSE = 1) and only 6.7% of maintain multiple share classes (DualClass = 1).   
Summary statistics in Panel C for our IPO outcomes reveal a mean Revision (Underpricing) 
of -6.1% (15.2%) and an average institutional stake in the post-IPO period of 1%. Post-IPO analyst 
                                                          
19 We create this variable because the JOBS Act reduces prospectus disclosure requirements for emerging growth 
companies, which are the bulk of the IPOs in our post-2012 sample. 
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following is 6.8 (6) at the mean (median), while the natural log of media coverage shows that the 
median firm has 42 (e3.706) Dow Jones news flashes or full articles in the one-year post-IPO period. 
4.2 Disclosures around the Securities Offering Reform 
As noted above, our identification strategy exploits passage of the SOR as a source of quasi-
exogenous and predictable variation for issuing visibility-enhancing pre-prospectus disclosures. We 
first examine the information content of press releases in the years surrounding the SOR’s passage to 
determine whether the type and frequency of pre-prospectus disclosures indeed change as a result of 
this regulation.20 In Table 3, we document the disclosure category Ravenpack assigns to each of the 
press releases issued by IPOs for our full sample of 569 IPOs and separately for the subsamples of 99 
IPOs in the pre-SOR period (with an initial SEC filing date on or before March 1, 2006) and 89 IPOs 
in the immediate post-SOR period (with an initial SEC filing date between March 1, 2006 and March 
1, 2008). In the full sample, we find that pre-prospectus press releases primarily discuss product or 
service offerings (35.7% of all press releases) followed by equity actions (21.1%) and labor issues 
including executive appointments and turnovers (16.9%). More importantly, turning to the pre- and 
post-SOR subsamples reveals that earnings- and revenue-related press releases occur more frequently 
in the pre-SOR period (8.6% of pre-SOR vs. 1.3% of post-SOR press releases) as do press releases 
discussing equity actions (23.7% of pre-SOR vs. 15.5% of post-SOR press releases), consistent with 
the SOR prohibiting mentions of upcoming equity issuances prior to filing a prospectus and 
prohibiting the release of forward-looking information. The categories that firms shift toward in their 
post-SOR press release issuance include those discussing labor issues (10.3% increase), upcoming 
conference participation (3.0% increase), and product/service offerings (7.1% increase).  
Beyond this analysis, we also examine whether there are significant changes in the proportion 
of IPO firms employing pre-prospectus disclosures and the timing of these disclosures. The SOR 
                                                          
20 We are unable to conduct a similar analysis of investor conferences given the small number of firms attending 
conferences in the pre-SOR period. 
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liberalized pre-prospectus disclosures by providing safe harbor for permitted disclosures, specifically 
allowing the release of factual business information as long as the information is materially 
consistent with the firm’s past disclosure policies (in timing, manner, and form). Consistent with this 
encouraging firms to engage in pre-prospectus disclosure, we find a significant increase of 12.6% (p-
value< 0.10) in the proportion of IPO firms issuing press releases in the post-SOR period.21 In 
addition, we also find that firms issuing pre-prospectus press releases in the post-SOR regime do so 
more evenly over the period, based on a weighted average release time that is 146 days (97 days) 
prior to the prospectus filing over the one-year period for IPOs in the post-SOR (pre-SOR) regime. 
The significant difference of 49 days (p-value < 0.01) suggests that following the SOR, IPO firms do 
not cluster press releases in the period immediately before filing the prospectus. Overall, preliminary 
descriptive evidence for press releases in Table 3 indicates that the SOR drives predictable variation 
in IPO firms’ use of visibility-enhancing disclosures in that pre-prospectus disclosure following the 
SOR increases and is tilted toward visibility-enhancing disclosures, rather than detailed and 
quantitative financial information. This allows us to better identify whether such disclosures have 
visibility enhancing effects on subsequent IPO outcomes.  
5. Main Results 
5.1.  Results of information acquisition tests (H1) 
The first prediction we develop from Merton’s (1987) model concerns the relation between 
pre-prospectus disclosures and information acquisition by prospective investors ahead of the IPO. 
Specifically, we predict that firms with more extensive visibility-enhancing disclosures will 
experience greater information acquisition by prospective investors, consistent with these investors 
processing detailed firm information once they become aware of the firm’s existence (i.e., in 
response to an increase in firm visibility).  
                                                          
21 All p-values presented and discussed in the text are based on two-tailed tests for significance. 
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Table 4 presents results for the natural log of EDGAR search activity (Log_EDGAR) during 
the filing period ending with the IPO offering date where Panel A (B) reports OLS regressions 
(entropy-balanced weighted OLS regressions). Consistent with pre-prospectus disclosures enhancing 
visibility (and thereby information acquisition) for prospective investors, we find a significant 
positive relation for pre-prospectus press releases (Log_PR) in both Panels A and B and an 
insignificant (significantly positive) relation for conference attendance (IConf) in Panel A (Panel B). 
In particular, models (2) – (4) in Panel A display significant positive coefficients ranging between 
0.102 – 0.117 on Log_PR. Focusing on the 0.117 (0.074) coefficient estimate from model (4) in 
Panel A (model 3 in Panel B) for Log_PR implies a predicted increase in search activity of 11.1% 
(6.4%) for a one-standard deviation increase in press release issuance. In addition, the entropy 
balancing results in Panel B suggest that the relation between pre-prospectus press releases and 
Log_EDGAR is significantly smaller in the pre-SOR period (coeff. = -0.106, p-value < 0.10). 
Turning to the results for conference attendance, the significant coefficient in model (1) in Panel B 
for IConf implies an increase in search activity of 22.3% (e0.201 – 1) as a result of attending at least 
one conference. These estimates provide evidence of a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful complementary relation between voluntary pre-prospectus disclosures and the acquisition 
of regulated financial information during the IPO filing window that includes the IPO roadshow, the 
latter of which is the focus of prior research on IPO disclosure (e.g., Leone et al., 2007). 
5.2.  Results of IPO pricing tests (H2) 
The second prediction we develop from Merton’s (1987) model is that visibility-enhancing 
disclosures should positively affect investor demand for the firm’s shares. Table 5 tests this 
prediction by providing the results of our analysis of filing price revisions (Revision) and first-day 
Underpricing. Prior research shows that the initial filing price range in the IPO prospectus does not 
capture all publicly available information (Lowry and Schwert, 2004; Willenborg et al., 2015). 
Coupled with Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) argument that offer price revisions reflect investor 
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demand during the roadshow process, we start by examining whether a relation exists between pre-
prospectus disclosure and the filing price revision.  
Turning to Panel A of Table 5 reveals evidence of a significantly positive association 
between Revision and pre-prospectus disclosure. Using the OLS estimates from model (1) in Panel A 
reveals that investor conference attendance is associated with significant upward price revisions 
(IConf coeff. = 7.913, p-value < 0.01). Models (3) and (4) demonstrate that this association is also 
largely preserved after controlling for press release issuance where press releases are significantly 
positively associated with price revisions in models (2) and (3) (Log_PR coeff. = 3.768 and 3.220, p-
values < 0.01, respectively). A closer look at the results in model (4) reveals that the positive relation 
with press release issuance is concentrated in the post-SOR period, with a significant positive 
coefficient for Log_PR (coeff. = 4.390, p-value < 0.01) and a significant negative coefficient for the 
interaction between the PreSOR indicator and Log_PR (coeff. = -4.194, p-value < 0.10). Based on 
estimates in model (4), a one-standard deviation increase in Log_PR is associated with a Revision of 
3.45% in the post-SOR period. Given that median proceeds are $85.5 million, in economic terms, 
this translates into an additional $2.9 million in funds raised by the firm. Since evidence of a positive 
relation for press releases occurs only in the post-SOR period, the inference is that there is a greater 
role for visibility-enhancing disclosures following the SOR reform. This inference is further 
enhanced by the estimates in Panel B based on the entropy-balanced control sample that are largely 
in line with those in Panel A, with significant positive associations between price revisions and pre-
prospectus disclosure. The entropy-balanced results, coupled with our shock to firms’ ability to 
provide pre-prospectus disclosures (i.e., the SOR), provide further evidence that IPO pricing is driven 
by the issuance of pre-prospectus disclosure rather than firm fundamentals that differ between our 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms. 
Table 5 also presents results for Underpricing. On one hand, the results of prior research 
imply a negative relation between more extensive pre-IPO voluntary disclosure and IPO 
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underpricing, resulting from a reduction in adverse selection costs (e.g., Boone et al., 2016; Jog and 
McConomy, 2003; Barth et al., 2017). This evidence is consistent with voluntary disclosures via the 
prospectus aiding investors in assessing a more precise distribution of value for an IPO firm and thus 
lowering underpricing (Leone et al., 2007), where underpricing is a function of ex ante uncertainty 
(Ritter, 1987; Ljungqvist, 2007). On the other hand, if underpricing reflects investor attention either 
from the filing price revision not fully incorporating the demand information in the filing period 
(Hanley, 1993) or new attention from retail investors (Cook et al., 2006), then we would observe a 
positive relation between pre-prospectus disclosure activities and Underpricing (H2). Consistent with 
elevated investor visibility following pre-prospectus disclosure, the results for models (6) – (8) in 
Panel A exhibit significant positive coefficients for Log_PR. For example, the results for model (8), 
which incorporates the interaction between the PreSOR indicator and press release disclosure, reveals 
that a one-standard deviation increase in Log_PR is associated with 3.3% more underpricing 
(Log_PR coeff. = 3.3, p-value < 0.05). Similar to the results above for Revision, in model (8) we also 
observe a negative coefficient for the PreSOR * Log_PR interaction terms. Turning to the entropy-
balanced estimates in Panel B, both IConf and Log_PR exhibit significant positive associations with 
Underpricing in models (4) – (6), with a significant negative coefficient on the PreSOR * Log_PR 
interaction term in model (6) (coeff. = -3.557, p-value < 0.05).  
In sum, evidence of a significant positive relation between Underpricing and pre-prospectus 
disclosure in the post-SOR period is consistent with underpricing reflecting either (or both) a partial 
adjustment to investor demand by the underwriter following visibility-enhancing disclosure or 
increased uncertainty for firms with more extensive pre-prospectus disclosures (Ritter, 1987; 
Ljungqvist, 2007). In addition, our entropy balancing test procedures mitigate concerns that the 
relation with Underpricing is due to differing levels of pre-IPO firm-specific uncertainty as reflected 
in a differing distribution of fundamental covariates across disclosing and non-disclosing firms, as 
opposed to the effect of pre-prospectus disclosures we hypothesize.   
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5.3  Results of IPO ownership tests (H3)  
Table 6 tests our third prediction for a positive relation between ownership dispersion and 
pre-prospectus disclosures. Models (1) – (4) examine the relation between pre-prospectus disclosure 
and the count of institutional owners with an ownership stake exceeding 1% of the firms’ equity in 
the immediate post-IPO period (Num_InstOwn>1%). Because these tests rely on a count of owners 
as the dependent variable, we rely on a negative binomial regression model designed for count data 
following the recommendation by Rock, Sedo, and Willenborg (2000). The negative binomial model 
adjusts for both the discrete nature of the count variable and its truncated distribution (i.e., a lack of 
negative values). Consistent with greater ownership dispersion for firms with more extensive pre-
prospectus disclosure, the results in Panel A reveal that Log_PR is negatively associated with the 
number of concentrated institutional holdings in models (2) – (4). Model (4)’s results demonstrate 
that the relation is more pronounced in the post-SOR period, with a significantly positive coefficient 
on the interaction for PreSOR*Log_PR (coeff. = 0.087, p-value<0.05) consistent with a limited 
relation between the extent of concentrated institutional holding and pre-prospectus disclosure in pre-
SOR periods. This inference is further supported in our entropy-balanced models in Panel B, with a 
significant negative coefficient on Log_PR in model (3), however the coefficient on interaction for 
PreSOR*Log_PR is insignificant in this model. Additionally, the relation between IConf and the 
extent of concentrated institutional holdings is insignificant in both Panels A and B, an indication 
that conference attendance is unassociated with ownership dispersion. 
Turning to the relation between pre-prospectus disclosure and ownership dispersion 
(measured as the average institutional percentage stake, IO_AvgStake) in models (5) – (8) of Table 6, 
Panel A, we find some evidence that pre-prospectus press release issuance is associated with smaller 
average institutional stakes in the post-IPO period. This evidence supports our prediction of more 
dispersed ownership for these more visible firms following more extensive pre-prospectus disclosure 
activities. More specifically, examination of the results for models (6) – (8) reveals a negative 
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relation between press release issuance (Log_PR) and IO_AvgStake, with that relation concentrated 
in the post-SOR period (see model [8], where Log_PR coeff. = -0.100, p-value < 0.05). The inference 
here is that pre-prospectus disclosures are associated with somewhat larger institutional stakes in the 
pre-SOR regime, consistent with these disclosures increasing the depth rather than the breadth of 
ownership. However, that inference is attenuated by the results for the entropy-balanced models in 
Panel B, which exhibit insignificant coefficient estimates for IConf and Log_PR in models (5) – (7). 
In sum, results in Table 6 provide some evidence that firms with more extensive pre-prospectus press 
release disclosures exhibit more dispersed ownership.  
5.4  Results of post-IPO information intermediary tests (H4) 
Table 7 presents results of tests of our fourth hypothesis which predicts a positive relation 
between pre-prospectus disclosures and enhanced coverage by information intermediaries in the post-
IPO period. If pre-prospectus disclosures enhance firm visibility, then we expect higher coverage by 
sell-side analysts and by the financial press in the post-IPO period (e.g., Mehran and Peristiani, 2009; 
Bushee and Miller, 2012; Barber and Odean, 2008). Consistent with our hypothesis, models (2) – (4) 
in Panel A and models (2) – (3) in Panel B provide evidence of an economically significant positive 
association between Analyst_Count and press release issuance (Log_PR coefficients range from 
0.113 to 0.142, with p-values < 0.01) in our negative binomial models for Analyst_Count (see Rock 
et al., 2000). In addition, under the entropy-balanced tests in Panel B, the relation between IConf and 
Analyst_Count is also significant (coeff. = 0.155, p-value < 0.10). Using model (4)’s estimates in 
Panel A implies that a one-standard deviation increase in press release issuance in the post-SOR 
period is associated with a 13.5% increase in analyst following ([e0.129-1] * 0.978), representing 0.8 
additional analysts following the firm in the first-year post-IPO relative to the median analyst 
following of 6. Finally, there is evidence in Panel B’s model (3) that the relation between Log_PR 
and Analyst_Count is significantly more positive in post-SOR periods (PreSOR*Log_PR coeff. = -
0.115, p-value < 0.05).  
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Turning to the results for media coverage by the financial press, results in models (5) – (8) 
(models [5] – [7]) in Panel A (B) provide evidence of a positive relation between media coverage and 
both press release issuance and investor conference attendance similar to our results for analyst 
coverage. For example, model (8) shows significant positive relations between media article 
mentions in the one-year post-IPO period (Media_1Y) and the indicator for investor conference 
attendance (IConf coeff. = 0.156, p-value < 0.05) and the natural log of press releases (Log_PR coeff. 
= 0.129, p-value < 0.01). However, in contrast to the results in for analyst coverage, we find some 
evidence of a more pronounced pre-SOR relation between Log_PR and post-IPO media coverage 
after entropy balancing in Panel B (PreSOR * Log_PR coeff. = 0.218, p-value < 0.05). We interpret 
this as evidence that more news-worthy information is conveyed by press releases in the pre-SOR 
period, where firms use press releases less for visibility-enhancement prior to the reform.22 Overall, 
these findings indicate that after controlling for filing period financial press coverage of our sample 
of IPOs, voluntary disclosures serve a visibility-enhancing role that is incremental to media coverage 
during the roadshow period (Cook et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2014). 
5.5.  Results of information asymmetry tests (H5) 
The final hypothesis we develop tests Merton’s (1987, p.501) observation that visibility-
enhancing disclosures are fundamentally distinct from disclosures used to “provide substantive 
information” to shareholders. The key implication is that any declines in information asymmetry as a 
result of our pre-prospectus disclosures should be limited (or zero). Table 8 tests this by reporting 
results where post-IPO bid-ask spreads and post-IPO equity price volatility (both measured during 
the 24-day quiet period) are the dependent variables. With regard to volatility, in columns (1) - (4) 
we find only limited evidence that pre-prospectus disclosure activities are associated with post-IPO 
equity price volatility. That said, we do find a negative relation between press releases and post-IPO 
                                                          
22 In support of this inference, we find similar results when we exclude news flashes and focus only on full media 
articles by Dow Jones to measure post-IPO media attention. 
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stock volatility for IPOs in the pre-SOR regime in model (4) of panel (PreSOR * Log_PR coeff. = -
0.003, p-value < 0.05). However, this result vanishes under the entropy balancing test design in Panel 
B. Turning to the bid-ask spread tests in models (5) – (8) of Panel A, we observe no significant 
relations between post-IPO bid-ask spreads and pre-prospectus disclosures. Collectively, Table 8’s 
results buttress our earlier evidence and related inference that the pre-prospectus disclosure activities 
are most consistent with an intent to enhance firms’ financial visibility rather than to ameliorate 
informational asymmetries. 
6.  Additional Analyses 
6.1.  Results of tests for variation in managerial wealth revaluations 
 One feature of our results that deserves additional attention is evidence that firms with more 
extensive pre-prospectus disclosures exhibit increases in equity price that are only fully realized once 
the IPO begins trading. This implies that the price improvement theorized in Merton (1987), and 
observed here empirically, is only fully incorporated subsequent to the IPO. This raises the issue of 
how firms directly benefit from this underpricing. To provide some evidence for why managers may 
leave money on the table in the form of underpricing, Table 9 examines whether managers retain 
shares at the IPO (to limit exposure to underpricing). Inconsistent with the idea that firms retain more 
shares at the IPO in order to benefit from post-IPO equity markets via follow-on offerings, models 
(1) – (4) in Table 9 show no significant differences in ownership retention (Retain) across IPOs as a 
function of pre-prospectus disclosures. The lone exception is evidence of a significant positive 
relation in model (1) for IConf in Panel B (p-value<0.05) indicating that firms attending conferences 
retain 2.5% more shares at the IPO on average. Alternatively, prospect theory suggests that 
individuals are more concerned with changes in wealth relative to an anchored price rather than 
overall wealth levels (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). To formalize this argument in an IPO setting, 
existing IPO owners are expected to anchor to the initial IPO filing range and are satisfied when their 
wealth revaluation from shares retained exceeds the money left on the table from shares sold at IPO 
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(Loughran and Ritter, 2002).23 When we follow the approach by Loughran and Ritter (2002) in 
models (5) – (8) of Table 9, we find that insiders at firms providing more pre-prospectus disclosures 
(for both Log_PR and IConf) do achieve larger wealth revaluations from their retained shares relative 
to the money left on the table from the IPO issuance.24 Further, we find some evidence in both Panel 
A and Panel B that this relation is concentrated in the post-SOR period (with significant negative 
coefficients on the PreSOR * Log_PR interaction). This result is consistent with managers at firms 
with more pre-prospectus disclosure acquiescing to a lower IPO price in the presence of large wealth 
revaluations, especially in the post-SOR period.  
6.2.  Results of tests of pre-prospectus disclosure as underwriter promotion or hype 
The tests we report in in this section are designed to first rule out the concern that post-IPO 
pricing and pre-prospectus voluntary disclosure are merely artifacts of increased underwriter effort 
via due diligence or stock promotion. Hanley and Hoberg (2010) and Cook et al. (2006) find a 
positive association between proxies for underwriter effort and underwriter spreads. In unreported 
results we find no relation between pre-prospectus disclosures and underwriting spreads 
(UW_Spread). In addition, all of our tests include a control for underwriter rank (TopUW), aiding in 
ruling out a relation with more prestigious underwriting firms. We infer that greater underwriter 
promotion or due diligence does not appear to explain the effects of pre-prospectus disclosure that we 
document.25  
Second, we examine post-IPO equity performance to rule out a “hype” story for the positive 
association between IPO pricing and pre-prospectus disclosures. If IPOs with more extensive pre-
                                                          
23 Recent IPO research (e.g., Willenborg et al., 2015; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2005) finds support for the 
importance of wealth revaluations. 
24 Our measure of wealth revaluation (Wealth_Reval) is the change from the midpoint of the initial filing price range 
to the IPO offer price multiplied by the number of secondary shares sold plus the change from the midpoint of the 
initial filing price range to the first-day close price multiplied by the number of shares retained. 
25 We also estimated a Logit model (untabulated) predicting the TopUW indicator for whether the underwriter is 
classified as a top-ranked underwriter based on the order of their appearance in the “tombstone” advertisement 
(Carter and Manaster, 1990; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Inconsistent with pre-prospectus disclosure reflecting the 
presence of more prestigious underwriters, we find no relation with this ranking as a dependent variable. 
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prospectus disclosures are systematically over-priced as a result of investor sentiment related to these 
disclosures, we should observe systematic under-performance for these IPOs relative to a portfolio of 
similar firms. Inconsistent with investors over-pricing the IPO at the end of the first day of trading, 
we find no evidence of post-IPO underperformance (measured relative to a size and book-to-market 
reference portfolio) over the year following the offering (untabulated) by firms with more extensive 
pre-prospectus disclosure. We interpret this as further evidence that pre-prospectus disclosures are 
designed to enhance firm visibility, and are unassociated with any systematic mispricing of the shares 
in the offering as a result.  
7.  Conclusion    
We examine the role of pre-prospectus voluntary disclosures by firms pursuing an IPO. 
Drawing on Merton (1987), we hypothesize that such disclosures are used by firms to enhance 
visibility with prospective investors. Consistent with the benefits suggested by Merton (1987) to 
firms pursuing visibility-enhancing disclosures, we document that firms with more extensive pre-
prospectus press releases display greater pre-IPO investor acquisition of regulated financial 
information, more positive filing price revisions and underpricing, more dispersed investor 
ownership, and greater coverage by information intermediaries post-IPO. We document similar 
(although weaker) results for firms attending investor conferences in the pre-prospectus period. In 
contrast to prior research on the traditional role of pre-IPO voluntary disclosure in reducing adverse 
selection costs (see, e.g., Leone et al. 2007), our evidence indicates that pre-prospectus disclosure 
activities are primarily designed to enhance firm visibility. Consistent with this inference, we find no 
evidence that pre-prospectus press releases reduce information asymmetry. 
Evidence in this study is important for understanding the use of voluntary disclosure by 
private firms, an area that is far-less researched relative to disclosure for public firms (see Beyer et 
al., 2010 for a review). Our results suggest that by modifying their voluntary disclosure strategies as 
they prepare to go public, firms can capture valuable benefits beyond simply mitigating 
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informational asymmetries. Our study also contributes by shedding light on the economic 
consequences of pre-IPO voluntary disclosures following the SEC’s 2005 Securities Offering Reform 
that liberalized disclosure rules for issuers. In contrast to concerns that removing restrictions on 
disclosure would incent firms to “hype” their stock prior to raising capital (Lang and Lundholm, 
2000), we find no evidence that firms with more extensive pre-prospectus disclosures display inflated 
prices that reverse over time. 
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The number of unique analysts issuing earnings per share forecasts in I/B/E/S for the firm during the 12-
month post-IPO period beginning on day t+1 following the IPO offering date. 
Bank 
An indicator set to one for IPOs with a primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) on SDC Platinum 
that falls in the financial services industry (SIC codes: 6000 - 6999). 
BHAR1Y 
Buy-and-hold abnormal return calculated using CRSP daily return data for the firm’s one-year post-IPO 
return beginning on day t+1 following the IPO offering date. Abnormal return is based on subtracting the 
corresponding one-year buy-and-hold return to the firm’s Fama-French 5 x 5 size and B/M portfolio 
available from Kenneth French’s website: 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) 
BA_Spread1M 
The average of the daily ask - bid spread scaled by closing price for the 24 day quiet period beginning on 
day t+1 following the IPO offering date (source: CRSP). 
Big4 
An indicator variable set to one for auditors with a rank of 1 - 8 in COMPUSTAT to capture IPOs audited 
by Deloitte, Ernst and Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (and predecessors), and zero otherwise. 
DualClass 
An indicator variable set to one for issuers with multiple classes of shares, zero otherwise. Data on share 
classes are available on Jay Ritter's website: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ 
Exch_NYSE An indicator variable set to one for firms listing on the New York Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. 
HiTech_Bio 
An indicator variable set to one for IPOs classified as primarily operating in a high technology industry by 
SDC Platinum and that operate in the healthcare industry based on the Fama-French 10-industry 
classification, and zero otherwise. SDC’s classification is more detailed than that available through Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) industry codes. Data on the 10-industry classification is available from Ken 
French's website: (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) 
HiTech_NonBio 
An indicator variable set to one for IPOs classified as primarily operating in a high technology industry by 
SDC Platinum, but which do not operate in the healthcare industry based on the Fama-French 10-industry 
classification, and zero otherwise. SDC’s classification of high-technology firms is more detailed than that 
available through Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry codes. 
IConf 
An indicator variable for IPO firms attending at least one investor conference in the 12-month period ending 
with the filing of their IPO prospectus. Conference attendance is from Bloomberg’s EVTS database 
beginning in 2003 for event types tagged as Corporate Access, Analyst Marketing, and TV/Conf/Pres. 
Conference location in Bloomberg is unrestricted and may occur outside of the United States. We identify 
firms as attending investor conferences if they issue at least one press release in Ravenpack in the pre-
prospectus period where the type is listed as “conference-participant.” Based on a manual reading of these 
press releases, they are issued for similar investor conferences to those covered by Bloomberg. 
InstOwn 
The percentage of institutional ownership of the IPO firms’ equity as of the first available reporting date in 
Thomson Reuters following the IPO offering date. The initial measurement date of institutional ownership is 
restricted to occur during the 12 month period following the IPO. 
IPOCount_90 The number of firms filing for an IPO in the 90 days prior to firm i's offering date. 
Log_AGE 
Natural log of firm age available from the Field-Ritter dataset (Field and Karpoff, 2002; Loughran and 
Ritter, 2004) available on Jay Ritter's website: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/  
Log_AT 
Natural log of the book value of total assets in the firm's last available 10-K report (from COMPUSTAT) 
with a fiscal year-end date prior to the firm's IPO offering date. 
Log_EDGAR 
Natural log of the number of searches for regulatory documents available on the U.S. Security and Exchange 
Commission’s EDGAR site during the filing period ending with the IPO offering date. Searches originating 
from IP addresses associated with automated data retrieval services are eliminated following the approach 
by Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015).  
Log_Media_1Y 
[Media_PreIPO] 
For each sample IPO firm, the natural log of the number of media articles with a novelty score of 100 and a 
relevance score of 100 (which serves to identify the first-release articles written specifically about the firm) 
available via Ravenpack’s Dow Jones Edition (Version 4.0) during the 12-month post-IPO period beginning 
on day t+1 following the IPO offering date [i.e., during the filing period beginning with the prospectus filing 




Natural log of 1 + the count of press releases issued in the 12-month period ending with the prospectus 
filing. Press releases are retrieved from Ravenpack’s Dow Jones and PR Editions for Version 4.0 which 
cover major newswires including Dow Jones, PR Newswire, and BusinessWire. Ravenpack’s coverage for 
its Dow Jones (PR) Edition begins in 2000 (2004) with press release coverage back-filled for all entities 
added on or before July 28, 2014. Press releases must have a relevance score of 100 (i.e., be directly about 
the firm) and a novelty score of 100 (i.e., first instance of this press release). We exclude press releases with 
a type of “conference-organizer” as these stem from brokerage houses announcing individual attendees at a 
hosted conference, resulting in essentially duplicate press releases. 
Log_REVT 
Natural log of 1 + Total Revenue in the firm's last available 10-K report (from COMPUSTAT) with a fiscal 
year-end date prior to the firm's IPO offering date. 
Money_Left 
Money-left-on-the-table (in $millions) measured as the difference between the first-day closing price and the 
IPO offer price multiplied by the number of shares included in the IPO proceeds. 
NasdaqRET_90 
Value-weighted buy-and-hold return to the NASDAQ index over the 90 day window ending 1 day prior to 
the firm's IPO date (source: CRSP). 
NasdaqRET_File 
Value-weighted buy-and-hold return to the NASDAQ index for the period starting with the filing of the 
initial price range for the IPO and ending 1 day prior to the firm's IPO date (source: CRSP). 
New_FIN 
New debt and equity financing listed in the firm's last available 10-K report (from COMPUSTAT) with a 
fiscal year-end date prior to the firm's IPO offering date. New financing amounts are measured following 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) as [(common and preferred stock sold - equity repurchased) + (long-term debt 
issuance – debt retired)] / book value of total assetst-1. 
Num_InstOwn>1% 
The count of the number of institutional owners holding more than 1% of the IPO firms’ equity as of the 
first available reporting date in Thomson Reuters following the IPO offering date. The initial measurement 
date of institutional ownership is restricted to occur during the 12 month period following the IPO. 
PostJOBS 
An indicator variable set to one for IPOs with an offering date after the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
(JOBS Act) was signed into law on April 4, 2012 and zero otherwise. 
PreSOR 
An indicator variable set to one for IPOs with an initial SEC filing date on or before March 1, 2006 to allow 
for 9 out of 12 months during the one-year pre-prospectus period to overlap with the period prior to the 
passage of the Securities Offering Reform (SOR) on December 1, 2005, and zero otherwise. 
RDAD_Exp 
The proportion of operating expenses accounted for by research and development and advertising listed in 
the firm's first post-IPO 10-K report (from COMPUSTAT) for the fiscal year-end date prior to the offering 
(measured as (R&D + Advertising) / (Cost of goods sold + Selling, general, and administrative expenses).  
Retain 
The percentage of equity shares retained by the firm at the IPO, measured as 1 - (Shares included in IPO 
proceeds / Total shares outstanding after offer (source: SDC or CRSP). 
Revision Percentage change from the mid-point of the original IPO filing price range to the final offer price. 
ROA 
Return on assets computed using information in the firm's last available 10-K report (from COMPUSTAT) 
with a fiscal year-end prior to the firm's IPO offering date (measured as Net Income / Total Assets). 
STD_ARET1M 
Post-IPO idiosyncratic equity return volatility for the 24-day quiet period beginning day t+1 following the 
IPO offering date and measured as the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns measured as the firm’s 
daily return minus the daily return to the firm’s Fama-French 5 x 5 size and B/M portfolio available from 
Kenneth French’s website: (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) 
TopUW 
An indicator variable set to one for IPOs where the lead underwriter has a reputation rank of 9 (the highest 
rank available) based on the average order of appearance by the underwriter in the prospectus for IPOs 
underwritten over five-year windows beginning in 1980 (see Loughran and Ritter, 2004, Appendix C for 
details). Rankings are available from Jay Ritter's website: 
(https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2016/06/Underwriter-Rank-1980-2015.xls). 
Underpricing 
The first-day percentage change in equity price calculated as (first-day closing price / offer price - 1) less the 
value-weighted return to the CRSP market index. 
UW_Spread 
The percentage of IPO proceeds charged by the underwriter as compensation for managing the IPO (also 
referred to as the gross spread). 
VC An indicator variable set to one for IPOs with venture capital funding (source: SDC), and zero otherwise. 
Wealth_Reval 
IPO shareholder wealth revaluation (in $millions) measured by the change from the midpoint of the initial 
filing price range to the offer price multiplied by number of secondary shares sold plus the change from the 
midpoint of the initial filing price range to the first-day close price multiplied by number of shares retained. 
Wealth_Diff (rank) 
The IPO shareholder wealth difference is the rank (from zero to one) of the difference between the 




Cross-Sectional Determinants of Pre-prospectus Disclosure: 
Logit (OLS) regression models for the indicator (continuous) variable IConf (Log_PR). IConf  is set to one for IPOs 
firms that attend an investor conference in the 12-month period prior to the filing of its IPO prospectus, and to zero 
otherwise. Log_PR  is the natural log of 1 + number of press releases in Ravenpack issued by an IPO firm in the 12-
month period prior to the filing of its IPO the prospectus. Standard errors clustered by calendar quarter are presented 
in parentheses below the coefficients. The area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is provided 
as a measure of Logit model fit. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed p-values significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. 
 
Dependent Variable IConf Log_PR 
Model (1) (2) 
PreSOR -1.759*** -0.426*** 
 (-3.334) (-4.705) 
PostJOBS 1.746*** 0.166 
 (4.724) (1.421) 
ProdMktFluid 0.207*** 0.044*** 
 (4.053) (3.690) 
DualClass -0.293 -0.159 
 (-0.466) (-1.126) 
Log_AT 0.203 0.054* 
 (0.916) (1.870) 
Log_REVT -0.038 0.082*** 
 (-0.268) (2.954) 
ROA -0.345* 0.011 
 (-1.680) (0.214) 
Big4 1.389*** 0.212** 
 (2.998) (2.059) 
RDAD_Exp 0.628 0.545*** 
 (0.767) (3.092) 
New_FIN 0.032 0.239*** 
 (0.150) (2.911) 
VC 0.120 0.469*** 
 (0.202) (4.352) 
Log_Age -0.079 0.002 
 (-0.328) (0.043) 
HiTech_NonBio 1.509** 0.483*** 
 (1.973) (5.048) 
HiTech_Bio 0.983 -0.163 
 (1.565) (-1.320) 
Bank -1.045 -0.164 
 (-1.104) (-1.205) 
Constant -7.374*** -0.524*** 
 (-7.113) (-2.870) 
   
Observations 569 569 
ROC / Adjusted R2 0.881 0.308 
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Appendix B, continued 
 
Table B.2 
Results of covariate balance before and after entropy-balancing  
 
The table reports on the covariate balance before and after implementing entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012). Entropy balancing (EB) is used to identify a 
weighted control sample of IPOs with the same mean, variance, and skewness as the treatment sample on all selected covariates. The covariates selected for 
inclusion in the entropy balancing tests are those found to be significant determinants of pre-prospectus disclosures in Table B.1 of this Appendix. Panel A uses 
firms attending investor conferences as the treatment sample and assigns weights to control firms that do not attend these conferences in the pre-prospectus 
period. Panel B uses firms that issue press releases during the 12-month pre-prospectus period as the treatment sample and assigns weights to firms not issuing 
press releases as the control sample. The match ratio (see McMullin and Schonberger, 2015) is used to assess the number of control sample observations 
receiving above equal weights relative to the full control sample (a ratio of 0.5 indicates an even reweighting). To assess covariate balance for each covariate, we 
compute standardized differences calculated as the difference in means between treated and control samples divided by the standard deviation of the treated 
sample. Variance ratios are calculated as the ratio of the variance of each covariate in the treatment sample scaled by variance for the control sample. † denotes 
covariates with standardized differences (variance ratios) outside of the +/- 0.1 (4/5 and 5/4) bounds suggested by Rubin (2001) for a balanced covariate. See 
Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.  
 
Panel A: Covariate balance for firms attending (treated) vs. not attending (control) investor conferences in the pre-prospectus period  
Prior to matching: Attending Conference (95 IPOs) No Conferences (474 IPOs) Balance Statistics 
Covariate Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness Std Diff Variance Ratio 
ProdMktFluid 12.140 19.330 0.060 9.221 15.540 0.994 0.151† 1.244 
ROA -0.785 0.882 -2.064 -0.256 0.458 -4.959 -0.600† 1.925† 
Big4 0.937 0.060 -3.592 0.785 0.169 -1.386 2.542† 0.353† 
HiTech_NonBio 0.295 0.210 0.900 0.367 0.233 0.552 -0.345† 0.902 
                  
After EB:       
Covariate Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness Std Diff Variance Ratio 
ProdMktFluid 12.140 19.330 0.060 12.140 19.330 0.060 0.000 1.000 
ROA -0.785 0.882 -2.064 -0.785 0.882 -2.064 0.000 1.000 
Big4 0.937 0.060 -3.592 0.937 0.059 -3.590 0.000 1.008 
HiTech_NonBio 0.295 0.210 0.900 0.295 0.208 0.900 0.000 1.009 
                  




Table B.2, continued 
 
Panel B: Covariate balance for firms issuing press releases (treated) vs. firms without press releases (control) in the pre-prospectus period 
Prior to matching: Issuing Press Releases (384 IPOs) No Press Releases (185 IPOs) Balance Stats 
Covariate Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness Std Diff Variance Ratio 
Log_REVT 3.159 3.865 -0.279 3.611 3.061 -0.422 -0.117† 1.263† 
RDAD_Exp 0.358 0.093 0.557 0.136 0.048 2.073 2.382† 1.930† 
ProdMktFluid 10.230 18.370 0.718 8.624 13.480 0.952 0.087 1.363† 
New_FIN 0.364 0.244 1.465 0.199 0.138 2.003 0.676† 1.766† 
VC 0.857 0.123 -2.037 0.443 0.248 0.229 3.363† 0.496† 
Big4 0.867 0.116 -2.164 0.692 0.214 -0.831 1.518† 0.539† 
HiTech_NonBio 0.404 0.241 0.393 0.254 0.191 1.130 0.620† 1.267† 
                  
After EB:       
Covariate Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness Std Diff Variance Ratio 
Log_REVT 3.159 3.865 -0.279 3.160 3.861 -0.281 0.000 1.001 
RDAD_Exp 0.358 0.093 0.557 0.358 0.093 0.560 0.007 1.000 
ProdMktFluid 10.230 18.370 0.718 10.230 18.380 0.718 0.000 0.999 
New_FIN 0.364 0.244 1.465 0.363 0.244 1.467 0.002 1.001 
VC 0.857 0.123 -2.037 0.855 0.125 -2.016 0.015 0.986 
Big4 0.867 0.116 -2.164 0.866 0.116 -2.154 0.007 0.992 
HiTech_NonBio 0.404 0.241 0.393 0.403 0.242 0.395 0.002 0.998 
                  
Match Ratio 0.28 Ratio: Firms with above equal weights in e-balance / All control firms 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection for IPOs with filing dates on or after January 1, 2004 and an offering date on or 
before July 28, 2014 
 
Sample selection details (Panel A) and a frequency distribution of the final sample by year (Panel B). See 
Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.  
 
Panel A: Sample selection  Observations 
Initial public offerings for U.S. firms in SDC Platinum with a non-missing CUSIP where 
the issue is common stock and the filing date is on or after 1/1/2004 and the offer 
date is before 7/29/2014 (sample period is designed to align with coverage by 
Ravenpack and Bloomberg) 
1,863 
Less: IPOs that were previously leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, limited partnership 
offerings, trusts, closed end funds, open end funds, or special purpose entities. 
(892) 
Less: Observations without a valid link to COMPUSTAT based on historical CUSIP. (147) 
Less: Observations filing with the SEC more than 3 months prior to the IPO (typically 
firms with publicly-traded debt). 
(35) 
Less: Observations missing data foe variables related to underpricing, price revisions, 
underwriter spread, firm age from Jay Ritter's IPO data, post-IPO reference 
portfolio returns in CRSP, post-IPO institutional ownership from Thomson 
Reuters, or annual COMPUSTAT data prior to the IPO 
(165) 
Less: Observations with media coverage in the form of full articles appearing on the 
Dow Jones Edition of Ravenpack in the one-year period extending from 12 - 24 
months prior to filing the IPO prospectus. 
(40) 
Less: Outlying observations. (15) 
Final sample of IPOs 569 
 
 
Panel B: Yearly frequency of IPOs in the full sample and sub-samples of IPOs attending investor 







Offer Year Frequency % of Sample Frequency 
% of IPOs 
(row %) 
Frequency 
% of IPOs 
(row %) 
2004 83 14.6% 1 1.2% 44 53.0% 
2005 63 11.1% 3 4.8% 32 50.8% 
2006 74 13.0% 8 10.8% 50 67.6% 
2007 78 13.7% 9 11.5% 53 67.9% 
2008 10 1.8% 0 0.0% 8 80.0% 
2009 12 2.1% 1 8.3% 7 58.3% 
2010 48 8.4% 4 8.3% 33 68.8% 
2011 36 6.3% 9 25.0% 25 69.4% 
2012 33 5.8% 10 30.3% 30 90.9% 
2013 70 12.3% 33 47.1% 61 87.1% 
2014 62 10.9% 17 27.4% 41 66.1% 
         
Total 569  95  384  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the final sample of 569 IPOs with a filing date after 1/1/2004 and an 
offering date prior to 7/28/2014 with data available to calculate the determinants of pre-prospectus 
disclosure and IPO outcome variables 
 
This table presents summary statistics for variables used in our analysis. See Appendix A for detailed 
variable definitions.  
 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Panel A: Disclosure and Regulatory Variables     
 IConf 0.167 0.373 0 0 0 0 1 
 Log_PR 1.127 0.978 0.000 0.000 1.099 1.946 4.060 
 PreSOR 0.315 0.465 0 0 0 1 1 
 PostJOBS 0.267 0.443 0 0 0 1 1 
Panel B: Determinants and Control Variables     
 VC 0.722 0.448 0 0 1 1 1 
 HiTech_NonBio 0.355 0.479 0 0 0 1 1 
 HiTech_Bio 0.330 0.471 0 0 0 1 1 
 Bank 0.123 0.329 0 0 0 0 1 
 Log_AT 4.052 1.468 -0.237 3.184 3.932 4.728 9.402 
 Log_REVT 3.306 1.909 0.000 2.026 3.729 4.573 8.138 
 ROA -0.344 0.753 -6.942 -0.520 -0.103 0.046 0.685 
 RDAD_Exp 0.286 0.299 0.000 0.026 0.181 0.498 1.293 
 ProdMktFluid 9.708 4.162 2.315 6.559 8.973 12.320 25.102 
 New_FIN 0.310 0.464 -0.216 0.000 0.071 0.519 2.431 
 Big4 0.810 0.392 0 1 1 1 1 
 DualClass 0.067 0.250 0 0 0 0 1 
 Log_Age 2.276 0.663 0.000 1.946 2.197 2.639 4.812 
 TopUW 0.301 0.459 0 0 0 1 1 
 Log_Media_PreIPO 0.892 0.577 0.000 0.693 1.099 1.099 3.367 
 NasdaqRET_File 0.035 0.076 -0.327 -0.008 0.036 0.073 0.295 
 NasdaqRET_90 0.045 0.069 -0.161 0.006 0.048 0.089 0.384 
 IPOCount_90 56.060 17.813 4 43 57 66 106 
 Exch_NYSE 0.227 0.419 0 0 0 0 1 
Panel C: IPO Outcome Variables      
 Log_EDGAR 8.939 0.767 1.946 8.583 8.989 9.370 12.333 
 Underpricing 15.163 23.034 -29.532 -0.271 9.416 24.721 207.674 
 Revision -6.116 23.361 -73.333 -21.739 -3.704 9.091 116.667 
 BASpread_1M 0.870 0.648 0.087 0.430 0.691 1.124 5.656 
 Std_ARET1M 0.033 0.017 0.006 0.021 0.029 0.041 0.148 
 Log_Media_1Y 3.706 0.953 0.000 3.434 3.807 4.190 5.403 
 Analyst_Count 6.831 4.448 0 4 6 9 33 
 Num_InstOwn>1% 7.262 5.196 0 4 7 10 33 
 IO_AvgStake 1.032 0.826 0.001 0.490 0.825 1.299 7.186 
 InstOwn 29.564 21.207 0.001 15.622 25.899 38.603 100.000 
 Retain 0.705 0.152 0.000 0.662 0.738 0.792 0.964 
 Wealth_Reval 83.711 472.034 -455 -40 1 97 8,444 
 Money_Left 19.611 39.741 -63 0 6 25 418 
 Wealth_Diff (rank) 0.500 0.289 0.000 0.250 0.500 0.750 1.000 
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Table 3 
Press release categories and duration surrounding the Securities Offering Reform (SOR) 
 
Properties of the press releases issued by the full sample of IPO firms in the 12 months prior to the filing of their IPO prospectus. Press releases 
are obtained from Ravenpack. Also reported are properties of the press releases for the sample of 99 (89) IPOs issuing press releases in the Pre- 
(Post-) Securities Offering Reform (SOR) period. Pre-SOR covers IPOs with a filing date between January 1, 2004 and March 1, 2006. Post-SOR 
covers IPOs with a filing date between March 2, 2006 and March 1, 2008. The classification of press releases relies on the “group” field as defined 
by Ravenpack in its Version 4.0.  
 




% of Total 
Pre-SOR:  
% of Total 
Post-SOR:  
% of Total 
Difference: 
Post - Pre 
Earnings / Revenues 89 2.7% 8.6% 1.3% -7.3% 
Equity Actions 696 21.1% 23.7% 15.5% -8.3% 
Labor Issues 558 16.9% 12.4% 22.7% 10.3% 
Marketing: Conference Participation 144 4.4% 1.7% 4.7% 3.0% 
Products/Services 1,181 35.7% 30.9% 38.0% 7.1% 
All remaining categories 638 19.3% 22.6% 17.8% -4.8% 
      
IPOs issuing press releases  384 99 89  
Total # of press releases issued  3,306 695 847 152 
Percentage of firms issuing press releases 67.5% 55.3% 67.9% 12.6% * 
Weighted average # of days pre-prospectus 133 97 146 49 *** 







Pre-IPO information acquisition and pre-prospectus disclosure 
 
Results for models explaining pre-IPO information acquisition by prospective investors measured by the natural log 
of the number of searches for regulatory documents on the Security and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR site 
during the filing period ending with the IPO offering date (Log_EDGAR). Results in Panel A (B) are based on OLS 
(weighted ordinary least squares models where weights are specified for the control sample of observations using 
entropy balancing; see Table B.2 of Appendix B for evidence of covariate balance after applying entropy balancing). 
The independent variables of interest are an indicator variable for whether the firm attends an investor conference 
(IConf) and the natural log of the number of press releases issued (Log_PR) by the firm in the 12-month period prior 
to the filing of its IPO prospectus. All models include IPO-level controls (see Eq. [1] in the text) along with 
indicators for the primary sector in which the IPO firm operates, the year of the offering, and the exchange on which 
the IPO is listed (indicators suppressed for presentation). Standard errors clustered by calendar quarter are presented 
in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed p-values significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. 
 
 
Dep. Variable Log_EDGAR 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: OLS models 
IConf 0.125  0.067 0.060 
 (1.522)  (0.785) (0.755) 
Log_PR  0.108*** 0.102*** 0.117*** 
  (3.568) (3.021) (3.924) 
PreSOR*Log_PR    -0.054 
    (-0.904) 
ProdMktFluid 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.013 
 (1.279) (1.127) (1.058) (1.071) 
DualClass 0.350*** 0.361*** 0.363*** 0.360*** 
 (3.507) (3.520) (3.562) (3.561) 
Log_AT 0.077** 0.072** 0.072** 0.073** 
 (2.273) (2.088) (2.078) (2.101) 
Log_REVT 0.050 0.041 0.042 0.041 
 (1.476) (1.241) (1.274) (1.257) 
ROA -0.025 -0.031 -0.028 -0.030 
 (-0.683) (-0.831) (-0.769) (-0.818) 
RDAD_Exp 0.059 0.019 0.014 0.007 
 (0.317) (0.108) (0.076) (0.037) 
New_FIN 0.080 0.054 0.055 0.052 
 (1.476) (1.042) (1.061) (1.021) 
Big4 0.023 0.012 0.008 0.008 
 (0.210) (0.114) (0.073) (0.071) 
VC 0.198** 0.152* 0.154* 0.156* 
 (2.381) (1.925) (1.955) (1.979) 
TopUW 0.219*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 
 (3.357) (3.200) (3.211) (3.179) 
NasdaqRET_90 -0.203 -0.228 -0.226 -0.246 
 (-0.454) (-0.496) (-0.500) (-0.543) 
IPOCount_90 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.268) (1.091) (1.144) (1.058) 
Log_Age -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.069 
 (-0.973) (-0.954) (-0.959) (-0.973) 
ProdMktFluid 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.013 
 (1.279) (1.127) (1.058) (1.071) 
DualClass 0.350*** 0.361*** 0.363*** 0.360*** 
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 (3.507) (3.520) (3.562) (3.561) 
Log_AT 0.077** 0.072** 0.072** 0.073** 
 (2.273) (2.088) (2.078) (2.101) 
Log_REVT 0.050 0.041 0.042 0.041 
 (1.476) (1.241) (1.274) (1.257) 
ROA -0.025 -0.031 -0.028 -0.030 
 (-0.683) (-0.831) (-0.769) (-0.818) 
RDAD_Exp 0.059 0.019 0.014 0.007 
 (0.317) (0.108) (0.076) (0.037) 










Observations 569 569 569 569 
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.360 0.360 0.359 
     
Panel B: Entropy-balanced models 
IConf 0.213**    
 (2.612)    
Log_PR  0.046* 0.074***  
  (2.012) (3.276)  
PreSOR*Log_PR   -0.106*  
   (-1.722)  
     
Additional Controls 
Included? 









Observations 569 569 569  





IPO pricing and pre-prospectus disclosure 
 
Results for models explaining IPO price changes measured as filing period price revisions between the initial file price and the 
final price set for the IPO (Revision) and IPO underpricing measured as the first-day percentage change in price less the value-
weighted return to the CRSP market index (Underpricing). Results in Panel A (B) are based on OLS (weighted ordinary least 
squares models where weights are specified for the control sample of observations using entropy balancing; see Table B.2 of 
Appendix B for evidence of covariate balance after applying entropy balancing). The independent variables of interest are an 
indicator variable for whether the firm attends an investor conference (IConf) and the natural log of the number of press releases 
issued (Log_PR) by the firm in the 12-month period prior to the filing of its IPO prospectus. All models include IPO-level 
controls (see Eq. [1] in the text) along with indicators for the primary sector in which the IPO firm operates, the year of the 
offering, and the exchange on which the IPO is listed (indicators suppressed for presentation). Models where Revision 
(Underpricing) is the dependent variable include an additional control for the filing period return to the NASDAQ index, 
NasdaqRET_File (filing period price revision, Revision). Standard errors clustered by calendar quarter are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed p-values significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. 
 
Dep. Variable Revision Underpricing 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: OLS models 
        
IConf 7.913***  6.094*** 5.528** 6.536  5.230 4.871 
 (3.789)  (2.767) (2.471) (1.454)  (1.120) (1.039) 
Log_PR  3.768*** 3.220*** 4.390***   2.910** 2.467* 3.292** 
  (4.050) (3.310) (3.581)   (2.433) (1.989) (2.257) 
PreSOR*Log_PR    -4.194***     -2.898* 
     (-2.954)     (-1.728) 
ProdMktFluid -1.257*** -1.274*** -1.353*** -1.321*** 0.273 0.263 0.186 0.200 
 (-3.320) (-3.214) (-3.458) (-3.310) (0.983) (1.027) (0.700) (0.750) 
DualClass 0.880 1.148 1.306 1.106 2.763 2.940 3.093 2.945 
 (0.297) (0.401) (0.453) (0.389) (1.006) (1.143) (1.185) (1.099) 
Log_AT 0.381 0.248 0.217 0.273 -0.683 -0.783 -0.807 -0.769 
 (0.366) (0.227) (0.206) (0.260) (-0.523) (-0.606) (-0.621) (-0.596) 
Log_REVT 2.093** 1.772** 1.852** 1.805** 0.817 0.571 0.652 0.629 
 (2.498) (2.071) (2.219) (2.203) (0.491) (0.352) (0.406) (0.393) 
ROA 0.539 0.231 0.451 0.314 2.653 2.397 2.589 2.493 
 (0.597) (0.242) (0.491) (0.341) (1.684) (1.502) (1.593) (1.522) 
RDAD_Exp 1.115 0.205 -0.321 -0.881 2.361 1.732 1.274 0.898 
 (0.170) (0.031) (-0.049) (-0.136) (0.419) (0.343) (0.235) (0.166) 
New_FIN -0.689 -1.565 -1.458 -1.698 1.384 0.692 0.777 0.593 
 (-0.309) (-0.662) (-0.628) (-0.739) (0.460) (0.225) (0.249) (0.188) 
Big4 -0.066 -0.172 -0.547 -0.567 -3.113 -3.153 -3.481* -3.490* 
 (-0.023) (-0.062) (-0.194) (-0.199) (-1.627) (-1.486) (-1.740) (-1.729) 
VC 1.642 0.060 0.268 0.421 9.492*** 8.261*** 8.446*** 8.539*** 
 (0.619) (0.021) (0.092) (0.147) (3.907) (3.325) (3.439) (3.407) 
TopUW 6.510*** 6.048** 6.110** 6.076** 5.352** 5.028** 5.121** 5.139** 
 (2.737) (2.632) (2.674) (2.689) (2.559) (2.432) (2.458) (2.484) 
NasdaqRET_[File, 90] 22.106 23.132* 22.915* 23.362* 16.503 15.953 16.483 15.701 
 (1.661) (1.778) (1.790) (1.819) (1.496) (1.492) (1.489) (1.408) 
IPOCount_90 -0.049 -0.061 -0.054 -0.067 -0.040 -0.051 -0.045 -0.055 
 (-0.539) (-0.680) (-0.611) (-0.786) (-0.903) (-1.073) (-0.917) (-1.071) 
Log_Age -2.117 -2.092 -2.145 -2.172 0.516 0.539 0.476 0.452 
 (-1.208) (-1.175) (-1.208) (-1.247) (0.359) (0.366) (0.330) (0.312) 
 48 
Revision     0.458*** 0.454*** 0.447*** 0.442*** 
     (6.367) (5.790) (5.973) (5.818) 


























Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.196 0.202 0.207 0.297 0.299 0.302 0.304 
         
 Panel B: Entropy-balanced models     
IConf 7.513***    5.364*    
 (3.337)    (1.686)    
Log_PR  3.478*** 4.757***    2.684** 3.628**  
  (3.170) (3.763)    (2.186) (2.701)  
PreSOR*Log_PR   -5.020**     -3.557**  
   (-2.667)     (-2.099)  
          
Additional Controls 
Included? 






















Observations 569 569 569  569 569 569  





IPO ownership and pre-prospectus disclosure 
 
Results for models explaining the count of institutional owners holding more than 1% of the IPO firms’ equity as of the first 
available reporting date in Thomson Reuters during the 12-month period following the IPO (Num_InstOwn>1%) and the average 
percent ownership for each institutional owner listed on the first available reporting date in Thomson Reuters during the post-IPO 
period (IO_AvgStake). Tests where Num_InstOwn>1% is the dependent variable rely on a negative binomial regression model 
designed for count data following the recommendation by Rock, Sedo, and Willenborg (2000). Results in Panel A (B) are based 
on unweighted negative binomial and OLS regression models (weighted regression models where weights are specified for the 
control sample of observations using entropy balancing; see Table B.2 of Appendix B for evidence of covariate balance after 
applying entropy balancing). The independent variables of interest are an indicator variable for whether the firm attends an 
investor conference (IConf) and the natural log of the number of press releases issued (Log_PR) by the firm in the 12-month 
period prior to the filing of its IPO prospectus. All models include IPO-level controls (see Eq. [1] in the text) along with 
indicators for the primary sector in which the IPO firm operates, the year of the offering, and the exchange on which the IPO is 
listed (indicators suppressed for presentation). Standard errors clustered by calendar quarter are presented in parentheses below 
the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed p-values significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See Appendix A 








 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Unweighted regression models         
IConf -0.073  -0.050 -0.037 -0.132  -0.095 -0.078 
 (-0.854)  (-0.603) (-0.450) (-1.637)  (-1.250) (-1.051) 
Log_PR  -0.046* -0.041* -0.067**   -0.074* -0.066* -0.100** 
  (-1.836) (-1.797) (-2.338)   (-1.977) (-1.812) (-2.527) 
PreSOR*Log_PR    0.087**    0.123 
    (2.293)    (1.595) 
ProdMktFluid 0.011 0.012* 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.022 
 (1.488) (1.650) (1.644) (1.604) (1.466) (1.451) (1.540) (1.465) 
DualClass -0.128* -0.129* -0.130* -0.125* 0.574*** 0.568*** 0.566*** 0.572*** 
 (-1.806) (-1.828) (-1.823) (-1.719) (5.243) (5.275) (5.212) (5.321) 
Log_AT -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.104*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.102*** 
 (-0.457) (-0.445) (-0.425) (-0.488) (-3.143) (-2.965) (-2.979) (-3.025) 
Log_REVT 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.019 -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.100*** 
 (0.658) (0.900) (0.863) (0.972) (-3.228) (-3.195) (-3.251) (-3.330) 
ROA 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.010 -0.020 -0.015 -0.018 -0.014 
 (0.367) (0.729) (0.520) (0.591) (-0.320) (-0.230) (-0.285) (-0.226) 
RDAD_Exp -0.224** -0.209* -0.205* -0.193* -0.302 -0.281 -0.273 -0.257 
 (-1.963) (-1.836) (-1.764) (-1.693) (-1.158) (-1.079) (-1.057) (-1.016) 
New_FIN -0.058 -0.048 -0.048 -0.043 0.002 0.020 0.018 0.026 
 (-1.571) (-1.270) (-1.269) (-1.134) (0.029) (0.237) (0.219) (0.312) 
Big4 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.060 
 (0.067) (0.180) (0.216) (0.247) (0.501) (0.539) (0.604) (0.595) 
VC 0.064 0.084 0.082 0.077 0.026 0.057 0.054 0.050 
 (1.119) (1.357) (1.345) (1.196) (0.256) (0.527) (0.502) (0.471) 
TopUW -0.082** -0.078** -0.078** -0.079** -0.117 -0.108 -0.109 -0.109 
 (-2.414) (-2.301) (-2.281) (-2.393) (-1.583) (-1.476) (-1.481) (-1.450) 
NasdaqRET_90 0.364 0.360 0.356 0.402 -0.052 -0.033 -0.037 0.008 
 (1.233) (1.275) (1.252) (1.365) (-0.082) (-0.053) (-0.058) (0.013) 
IPOCount_90 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004** 
 (-1.159) (-1.162) (-1.181) (-0.972) (1.696) (1.862) (1.815) (2.222) 
 50 
Log_Age -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 0.183** 0.182** 0.183** 0.184** 
 (-0.617) (-0.604) (-0.602) (-0.582) (2.663) (2.638) (2.648) (2.677) 
ProdMktFluid 0.011 0.012* 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.022 
 (1.488) (1.650) (1.644) (1.604) (1.466) (1.451) (1.540) (1.465) 
DualClass -0.128* -0.129* -0.130* -0.125* 0.574*** 0.568*** 0.566*** 0.572*** 
 (-1.806) (-1.828) (-1.823) (-1.719) (5.243) (5.275) (5.212) (5.321) 
InstOwn 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***     
 (17.935) (17.903) (18.055) (18.854)     


























Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 
Log-Likelihood / 
Adjusted R2 
-1363 -1362 -1362 -1359 0.126 0.128 0.128 0.131 
         
 Panel B: Entropy-balanced models     
IConf -0.077    -0.108    
 (-1.010)    (-1.313)    
Log_PR  -0.044 -0.060*    0.021 -0.001  
  (-1.513) (-1.694)    (0.577) (-0.033)  
PreSOR*Log_PR   0.054     0.086  
   (1.105)     (1.125)  
          
Additional Controls 
Included? 
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Post-IPO visibility and pre-prospectus disclosure 
 
Results for models explaining the count of the number of unique analysts issuing earnings per share forecasts for the firm 
during the 12-month post-IPO period in I/B/E/S (Analyst_Count) and the natural log of the number of media articles with a 
novelty score of 100 and a relevance score of 100 for the IPO firm (which indicate first-release articles written specifically 
about the IPO firm) available via Ravenpack’s Dow Jones and PR Editions during the 12-month post-IPO period 
(Log_Media_1Y). Tests where Analyst_Count is the dependent variable rely on a negative binomial regression model designed 
for count data following the recommendation by Rock, Sedo, and Willenborg (2000). Results in Panel A (B) are based on 
unweighted negative binomial and OLS regression models (weighted regression models where weights are specified for the 
control sample of observations using entropy balancing; see Table B.2 of Appendix B for evidence of covariate balance after 
applying entropy balancing). The independent variables of interest are an indicator variable for whether the firm attends an 
investor conference (IConf) and the natural log of the number of press releases issued (Log_PR) by the firm in the 12-month 
period prior to the filing of its IPO prospectus. All models include IPO-level controls (see Eq. [1] in the text) along with 
indicators for the primary sector in which the IPO firm operates, the year of the offering, and the exchange on which the IPO is 
listed (indicators suppressed for presentation). In addition, models where Log_Media_1Y is the dependent variable include an 
additional control for the natural log of the number of filing period media articles in Ravenpack (Log_Media_PreIPO). 
Standard errors clustered by calendar quarter are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote two-








 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Unweighted regression models         
IConf 0.127  0.063 0.058 0.228***  0.145* 0.156** 
 (1.604)  (0.814) (0.740) (2.890)  (1.899) (2.029) 
Log_PR  0.119*** 0.113*** 0.129***  0.164*** 0.151*** 0.129*** 
  (6.471) (5.723) (5.408)  (4.826) (4.575) (3.822) 
PreSOR*Log_PR    -0.062    0.085 
    (-1.399)    (1.068) 
ProdMktFluid 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.010 -0.014 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 
 (1.271) (0.977) (0.886) (0.914) (-1.084) (-1.151) (-1.288) (-1.326) 
DualClass 0.175* 0.193** 0.192** 0.186** -0.043 -0.030 -0.026 -0.022 
 (1.886) (2.272) (2.295) (2.225) (-0.325) (-0.240) (-0.207) (-0.170) 
Log_AT 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (3.271) (3.091) (3.107) (3.124) (0.114) (0.068) (0.052) (0.055) 
Log_REVT 0.033 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.145*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
 (1.571) (1.161) (1.163) (1.133) (3.525) (3.289) (3.323) (3.301) 
ROA 0.044 0.037 0.041 0.039 0.018 0.004 0.009 0.011 
 (1.054) (0.870) (0.928) (0.885) (0.411) (0.078) (0.197) (0.228) 
RDAD_Exp -0.178 -0.214 -0.222* -0.229* 0.156 0.090 0.078 0.085 
 (-1.348) (-1.586) (-1.703) (-1.748) (0.657) (0.371) (0.321) (0.349) 
New_FIN -0.024 -0.057 -0.055 -0.060 0.157** 0.113 0.115 0.119 
 (-0.374) (-0.910) (-0.875) (-0.969) (2.070) (1.572) (1.600) (1.659) 
Big4 0.162*** 0.145** 0.141** 0.140** 0.108 0.097 0.088 0.088 
 (2.738) (2.442) (2.358) (2.299) (1.233) (1.112) (0.998) (1.012) 
VC 0.284*** 0.229*** 0.233*** 0.235*** 0.529*** 0.468*** 0.473*** 0.472*** 
 (3.744) (3.173) (3.245) (3.268) (4.220) (3.498) (3.545) (3.465) 
TopUW 0.194*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.102 0.084 0.085 0.086 
 (3.769) (3.653) (3.665) (3.619) (1.254) (1.080) (1.090) (1.091) 
NasdaqRET_90 -0.345 -0.369 -0.366 -0.389 0.585 0.557 0.561 0.594 
 (-0.956) (-1.022) (-1.012) (-1.071) (1.331) (1.273) (1.281) (1.331) 
IPOCount_90 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.004* 
 52 
 (-0.251) (-0.399) (-0.361) (-0.538) (1.886) (1.749) (1.881) (1.912) 
Log_Age -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.114*** -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
 (-3.066) (-3.152) (-3.166) (-3.190) (-0.128) (-0.096) (-0.116) (-0.104) 


























Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 
Log-Likelihood / 
Adjusted R2 
-1432 -1423 -1422 -1421 0.360 0.372 0.373 0.374 
         
 Panel B: Entropy-balanced models 
    
IConf 0.155*    0.297***    
 (1.909)    (3.901)    
Log_PR  0.113*** 0.142***    0.187*** 0.136**  
  (4.829) (5.185)    (3.419) (2.474)  
PreSOR*Log_PR   -0.115**     0.218**  
   (-2.668)     (2.573)  
          
Additional Controls 
Included? 






















Observations 569 569 569  569 569 569  
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Table 8 
Information asymmetry, price volatility, and pre-prospectus disclosure 
 
Results for models explaining measures of post-IPO information asymmetry and price volatility during the 24-day quiet period 
following the start of IPO trading (excluding the offering date). During this period, firms’ disclosures are largely limited to 
disclosures of regulated information (such as earnings announcements). The average daily bid-ask spread is calculated using closing 
prices available on CRSP (BASpread_1M) and post-IPO equity volatility is the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns 
measured as the firm’s daily return minus the daily return to the firm’s Fama-French 5 x 5 size and B/M portfolio (STD_ARET1M). 
Results in Panel A (B) are based on OLS (weighted ordinary least squares models where weights are specified for the control sample 
of observations using entropy balancing; see Table B.2 of Appendix B for evidence of covariate balance after applying entropy 
balancing). The independent variables of interest are an indicator variable for whether the firm attends an investor conference (IConf) 
and the natural log of the number of press releases issued (Log_PR) by the firm in the 12-month period prior to the filing of its IPO 
prospectus. All models include IPO-level controls (see Eq. [1] in the text) along with indicators for the primary sector in which the 
IPO firm operates, the year of the offering, and the exchange on which the IPO is listed (indicators suppressed for presentation). 
Standard errors clustered by calendar quarter are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed p-
values significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. 
 
Dep. Variable STD_ARET1M BASpread_1M 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: OLS models         
IConf 0.003  0.003 0.003 -0.028  -0.012 -0.009 
 (1.328)  (1.133) (0.979) (-0.420)  (-0.168) (-0.125) 
Log_PR  0.001 0.001 0.002  -0.030 -0.029 -0.035 
  (1.263) (0.953) (1.677)  (-1.098) (-1.006) (-1.027) 
PreSOR*Log_PR    -0.003**    0.022 
    (-2.421)    (0.522) 
ProdMktFluid -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (-0.880) (-0.858) (-0.969) (-0.889) (0.888) (0.952) (0.954) (0.939) 
DualClass 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.033 
 (0.111) (0.121) (0.165) (0.075) (0.441) (0.392) (0.388) (0.405) 
Log_AT -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.122*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.121*** 
 (-2.357) (-2.368) (-2.389) (-2.401) (-5.167) (-4.975) (-4.990) (-5.012) 
Log_REVT 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.015 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
 (1.420) (1.298) (1.345) (1.309) (-0.906) (-0.720) (-0.733) (-0.716) 
ROA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.034 
 (-0.338) (-0.407) (-0.349) (-0.399) (0.597) (0.619) (0.614) (0.630) 
RDAD_Exp 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.120 0.132 0.133 0.135 
 (1.629) (1.551) (1.503) (1.396) (0.706) (0.777) (0.782) (0.796) 
New_FIN 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.049 0.057 0.057 0.058 
 (2.247) (2.186) (2.194) (2.149) (0.734) (0.834) (0.830) (0.844) 
Big4 -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.296*** -0.292*** -0.292*** -0.292*** 
 (-2.176) (-2.117) (-2.271) (-2.240) (-3.871) (-3.909) (-3.891) (-3.877) 
VC 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.079 -0.066 -0.066 -0.067 
 (0.952) (0.725) (0.767) (0.813) (-1.123) (-0.908) (-0.904) (-0.907) 
TopUW 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.073 -0.069 -0.070 -0.069 
 (0.917) (0.797) (0.830) (0.855) (-1.548) (-1.488) (-1.488) (-1.484) 
NasdaqRET_90 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 -1.015*** -1.008*** -1.009*** -1.001*** 
 (0.547) (0.505) (0.520) (0.358) (-2.919) (-2.888) (-2.878) (-2.810) 
IPOCount_90 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.805) (-0.912) (-0.847) (-1.201) (-0.061) (-0.044) (-0.048) (-0.025) 
Log_Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 (-1.501) (-1.493) (-1.496) (-1.564) (0.446) (0.445) (0.448) (0.453) 



























Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.157 0.159 0.164 0.350 0.351 0.350 0.349 
         
 Panel B: Entropy-balanced models     
IConf 0.002    0.099    
 (0.827)    (1.548)    
Log_PR  -0.001 -0.001    0.015 0.008  
  (-0.624) (-0.509)    (0.484) (0.228)  
PreSOR*Log_PR   0.000     0.026  
   (0.059)     (0.549)  
          
Additional Controls 
Included? 






















Observations 569 569 569  569 569 569  





Incentives for IPO managers 
 
Results for models explaining measures of the proportion of the firm’s equity ownership that is retained (rather than sold) in the IPO 
(Retain) and for the rank of the wealth revaluation difference (Wealth_Diff) that pre-IPO shareholders experience which is measured 
as the difference between money-left-on-the-table as a result of first-day underpricing (in $millions) and the wealth revaluation on 
secondary shares as a result of filing price revisions plus the change from the filing price to the first-day closing price on shares 
retained by the firm (which follows the approach by Loughran and Ritter, 2002). Results in Panel A (B) are based on OLS (weighted 
ordinary least squares models where weights are specified for the control sample of observations using entropy balancing; see Table 
B.2 of Appendix B for evidence of covariate balance after applying entropy balancing). The independent variables of interest are an 
indicator variable for whether the firm attends an investor conference (IConf) and the natural log of the number of press releases 
issued (Log_PR) by the firm in the 12-month period prior to the filing of its IPO prospectus. All models include IPO-level controls 
(see Eq. [1] in the text) along with indicators for the primary sector in which the IPO firm operates, the year of the offering, and the 
exchange on which the IPO is listed (indicators suppressed for presentation). Standard errors clustered by calendar quarter are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed p-values significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. 
 
Dep. Variable Retain Wealth_Diff (Rank) 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: OLS models 
        
IConf 0.013  0.011 0.010 0.098**  0.076* 0.068 
 (0.986)  (0.774) (0.733) (2.244)  (1.720) (1.575) 
Log_PR  0.005 0.004 0.005   0.047*** 0.040** 0.056*** 
  (0.966) (0.735) (1.050)   (3.037) (2.616) (3.141) 
PreSOR*Log_PR    -0.006    -0.056** 
    (-0.335)    (-2.109) 
ProdMktFluid 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
 (1.213) (1.195) (1.151) (1.148) (-2.781) (-2.772) (-2.952) (-2.821) 
DualClass -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.035 
 (-1.158) (-1.148) (-1.140) (-1.146) (0.553) (0.621) (0.652) (0.611) 
Log_AT 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (3.631) (3.566) (3.557) (3.561) (-0.025) (-0.150) (-0.183) (-0.131) 
Log_REVT 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.017 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 (1.840) (1.793) (1.825) (1.817) (1.493) (1.186) (1.303) (1.257) 
ROA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.017 0.013 0.016 0.014 
 (-0.105) (-0.165) (-0.117) (-0.138) (1.340) (1.012) (1.257) (1.110) 
RDAD_Exp 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 -0.011 -0.021 -0.028 -0.034 
 (0.651) (0.639) (0.604) (0.579) (-0.148) (-0.289) (-0.391) (-0.493) 
New_FIN 0.024* 0.022 0.023* 0.022 -0.013 -0.024 -0.022 -0.026 
 (1.734) (1.676) (1.694) (1.646) (-0.656) (-1.072) (-1.064) (-1.228) 
Big4 -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** -0.039** -0.031 -0.033 -0.037 -0.037 
 (-2.233) (-2.227) (-2.290) (-2.285) (-0.832) (-0.878) (-0.993) (-0.980) 
VC 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.045 0.026 0.029 0.030 
 (5.110) (4.901) (4.930) (4.997) (1.303) (0.716) (0.788) (0.853) 
TopUW 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 
 (3.082) (3.003) (3.014) (3.000) (3.216) (3.128) (3.178) (3.235) 
NasdaqRET_90 -0.170** -0.171** -0.171** -0.173** 0.726*** 0.715*** 0.717*** 0.698*** 
 (-2.374) (-2.411) (-2.384) (-2.355) (3.393) (3.331) (3.332) (3.264) 
IPOCount_90 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (1.305) (1.261) (1.283) (1.123) (0.736) (0.597) (0.701) (0.496) 
Log_Age -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 
 (-0.748) (-0.743) (-0.749) (-0.752) (-0.863) (-0.821) (-0.866) (-0.919) 






























Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.353 0.352 0.351 0.192 0.197 0.202 0.207 
         
 Panel B: Entropy-balanced models 
    
IConf 0.025**    0.084***    
 (2.212)    (2.790)    
Log_PR  0.002 0.001    0.042** 0.056***  
  (0.353) (0.229)    (2.561) (3.310)  
PreSOR*Log_PR   0.002     -0.055*  
   (0.214)     (-1.834)  
          
Additional Controls 
Included? 
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